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Abstract
Chapter 1 studies endogenous medium term cycles in a Schumpterian growth model.
New firms are created by imitating existing firms and they drive the least productive
firms out of business. In this manner, firm entry speeds up the process of creative
destruction, reallocating economic resources from less to more productive firms. Fur-
thermore, the rate of firm entry and intensity of reallocation are procyclical in this
model, and therefore transient business cycle shocks are propagated into persistent
medium term swings in productivity. While the model generates substantial amount
of medium term cycles, their magnitudes are not as large as those found in the data.
This is due to an endogenous tension arising from business stealing effect of Schum-
peterian models that weakens the basic transmission mechanisms in this model.
Chapter 2 develops a model of explicit marketplace competition between firms.
Firms compete through technological innovation; a firm with superior technology cap-
tures larger market share and earns higher profits than its rival. Arrow's replacement
effect in this model implies that industry followers have more to gain from innovations
than leaders, and consequently followers invest more heavily than leaders. Therefore,
followers derive higher proportions of their firm values from present value of growth
opportunities, and this implies that technological leaders and laggards are value and
growth firms, respectively. A novel, central empirical prediction of the model is that
when realized return on the value-minus-growth portfolio is positive, value firms de-
crease their investments relative to growth firms, and vice versa. This prediction
holds for capital expenditures, but not for R&D expenses in the data.
Chapter 3 (joint with Yichuan Liu) presents three sets of empirical results per-
taining to cross-sectional patterns in stock returns associated with various accounting
ratios such as return on assets, return on equity, gross and net profit margins, and
turnover ratios of accounts receivable and payable. First, we show that recent changes
in these accounting ratios, rather than their levels, are responsible for large returns
spreads. Second, we document fundamental momentum; long-short portfolios formed
by sorting on recent changes in these accounting ratios have significant alphas after
controlling for Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. Third, we
examine the findings of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) who conclude that the well-
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known price momentum effect is a manifestation of earnings momentum. We find, on
the contrary, that price momentum is not fully explained nor subsumed by earnings
momentum.
Thesis Supervisor: Leonid Kogan
Title: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Professor of Management
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Part 1
A Schumpeterian Model of Medium Term
Cycles
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies endogenous medium term cycles in aggregate productivity and their
asset pricing implications. The engine of economic growth in this model is creative de-
struction, or reallocation of economic resources from less productive to more productive
firms. In particular, creative destruction occurs through entry of new firms that replace
the least productive of existing firms. A key aspect of the model is that the intensity
of reallocation in the economy varies over time and shapes the medium term cycles in
aggregate productivity growth. There are two transmission mechanisms that are respon-
sible for cyclicality of creative destruction and propagation of transient shocks to medium
term cycles. First, we assume a form of real wage rigidity in the labor market, or slug-
gish adjustment of wages to their otherwise frictionless target levels. As in New Keynsian
models, real wage rigidity amplifies business cycle shocks. For example, in a recession,
wage will only slowly drop to its frictionless level. In the meantime this high wage relative
to the economic fundamentals would present an unfavorable business condition for poten-
tial entrants, and therefore the rate of firm entry would decrease. As a result, transient
business cycle shocks amplified by real wage rigidity will induce procyclical firm entries,
and therefore procyclical rate of reallocation in the economy as well. Second, we assume
that potential entrants create their firms by imitating existing firms. This feature of the
model will allow medium term cycles to sustain themselves beyond exogenous transient
shocks. Continuing our example of transient recessionary shock, even when the original
shock dissipates, stagnation in firm productivities resulting from reduced rate of realloca-
tion during the recession will discourage potential entrants who enter by mimicking the
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existing firms. Moreover, this results in a positive feedback loop where a slow rate of firm
entry lowers productivity growth in the economy, weakens incentives of future generations
of entrants, and ultimately reduces the rate of firm entry further. Taken together, these
two transmission mechanisms generate endogenous medium term cycles from exogenous
shocks with low persistence.
Medium term cycles are of great interest in both macroeconomics and finance. To be
concrete, we refer to medium term cycles as those with frequencies between 8 to 50 years,
compared to the typical business cycle frequencies of 2 to 8 years, as defined by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research. The term, medium term cycles, is from Comin and
Gertler (2006) who define medium term cycles as fluctuations with frequencies between 8
to 50 years, and find empirically that most of the mass in the medium term cycle frequen-
cies is concentrated in the 8 to 20 year frequency range. On the one hand, an important
line of research in macroeconomics explores medium frequency fluctuations in macroeco-
nomic variables. Motivated by the observation that many industrialized economies in the
post-war era have experienced both periods of sustained of growth, largely free of severe re-
cessions, and periods of extended stagnation (Blanchard, 1997; Comin and Gertler, 2006),
economists are increasingly interested in the significance and origins of medium frequency
fluctuations. For example in the post-war United States history, Comin and Gertler (2006)
present anecdotal and statistical evidences that United States has gone through periods of
prolonged booms and recessions, starting from post-war boom (1950's to early 1970's), fol-
lowed by the stagflation era (early 1970s to early 1990s), and the great moderation period
(early 1990s to mid 2000s). On the other hand, starting from the work of Bansal and Yaron
(2004) on long-run risks, financial economists have been interested in persisent, predictable
components in consumption growth rates. A key point in this literature is that even a very
small predictable component in consumption growth has far-reaching quantitative impli-
cations and can explain many salient features of the financial data, including the equity
premium, return predictability, and excess volatility. There is an extensive literature on the
origins of long-run risks, some on statistical validity of the long-run risk assumption and
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another on theoretical models in which long-run risks endogenously emerge. This paper
belongs to the latter literature on endogenous long-run risks in theoretical models. Earlier
works on this topic include Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) and Kung and Schmid
(2012). This paper is closely related to Kung and Schmid (2012) who also study a model of
endogenous growth based on Comin and Gertler (2006), and analyze asset pricing implica-
tions of medium term cycles in productivity through procyclical R&D. There are a number
of modeling distinctions between this paper and theirs. First, we emphasize reallocational
nature of creative destruction following innovations, rather than a horizonal perspective
on innovations, as the engine of economic growth. Second, in our model, real wage rigidity
rather than procyclical R&D spendings plays the main role as the short-term propagation
mechanism. Finally, we incorporate an element of endogenous growth through imitation,
and this helps to increase the persistence of endogenous medium term cycles, because it
allows for a feedback loop between productivity growth and rate of firm entry, even when
the exogenous shock dissipates.
Let us now briefly discuss the main elements of the model: creative destruction and
reallocation, real wage rigidity, and role of imitation in economic growth.
First, there is a growing evidence that the incessant process of creative destruction is
at the core of evolution of the market economies. A large empirical literature has em-
phasized the role of reallocation as an important driver of aggregate productivity growth.
Reallocation, broadly defined to include firm turnover through entry and exit, involves
transfer of capital and labor from low to high productivity firms. Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan (2000, 2006) document that reallocation accounts for approximately 50% of
manufacturing and 90% of retail productivity growth in the U.S. Such selection mechanism
in market economies has been studied in a number of theoretical models (Caballero and
Hammour, 1994; Melitz, 2003; Bloom, 2009, among others). In these models, high pro-
ductivity firms have competitive advantage over low productivity firms, and a substantial
fraction of aggregate productivity growth results as an outcome of market competition in
which economic resources shift to the more productive firms. In this paper, in particular,
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we develop a model in which entry of new firms will force exit of the least productive firms,
and therefore the rate of firm entry and exit will determine the intensity of reallocation,
and ultimately the rate of productivity growth in the economy.
Second, a number of authors have recently emphasized the role of real wage rigidity
in amplifying and propagating business cycle shocks (Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2005; Blanchard
and Gali, 2008). The idea is that the real wage is slow to react to changes in the economic
environment and this mechanism will serve as a propagation mechanism as in the New
Keynsian models. In other words, in response to a positive transient shock, the wage rate
will not fully rise its otherwise natural equilibrium level and the opposite occurs after a
negative shock. This sluggish adjustment distorts entry incentives for potential entrants.
For example, faced with favorable business conditions caused by wage rate below its natural
level, more potential entrants will come into the economy, thereby accelerating the pace
of reallocation. Furthermore, a higher rate of reallocation will have long-lived, positive
impact on productivity growth and it will induce more reallocation, creating a positive
feedback effect. In this manner, this model will propagate transient business cycle shocks
to medium term cycles that will be a result of cumulative series of transient shocks and
endogenous response of the economy.
Third, many empirical studies find that imitation is behind mass commercialization
of ground-breaking innovations and broad economic growth. Tilton (1971), for example,
found that the lag time between the initial discovery of semiconductor innovations by
American firms and the first commerical production by Japanese firms averaged just one
year. Mansfield, Schwarz, and Wagner (1981) found that 60% of the patented innova-
tions they studied were imitated within four years. In a similar spirit with this paper,
Gabler (2007) develops a theoretical model of endogenous growth where the main source
of economic growth over the long-run is imitation and mass distribution of ground-breaking
innovations.
In regards to the central propagation mechanism that the activity of creative destruc-
tion is procyclical, there are a number of papers that support the idea that the rate of
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reallocation falls in recessions. There are empirical and theoretical evidences that sup-
port this hypothesis. First, the most direct empirical evidence comes from Caballero and
Hammour (2005) who document that the cumulative reallocation in the labor market is
lower following recessions. They show that the labor market recovers from recessions by a
subsequent reduction in job destruction, rather than by an increase in job creation, and ar-
gue that this evidence points to the notion that recessions depress reallocation. They also
present a model with contracting frictions in both the labor and financial markets that
is consistent with the aforementioned empirical pattern. Second, firm entry is strongly
procyclical (Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2007; Jaimovich and Floetotto, 2008), and I ar-
gue that higher rate of firm entry leads to higher rate of reallocation. To the extent that
the new entrants are responsible for a nontrivial portion of radical technological innova-
tions, less entry would result in slower rate of replacement of old, inefficient firms by new,
efficient firms. Moreover, reallocation is an outcome of market competition, a selection
process in which more productive firms gain higher market share. Therefore, by increasing
competitive pressure on the existing firms, introduction of new entrants could accelerate
the process of selection and reallocation. Third, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) show that
while capital reallocation in the economy is procyclical, gains to reallocation is counter-
cyclical. This is a direct evidence for potential frictions preventing productivity-enhancing
reallocations in times of recessions. Finally, Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012) describe
models of macroeconomic fluctuations in which exogenous movements in uncertainty play
the central role. In presence of non-convex adjustment costs, a rise in uncertainty leads to a
drop in economic activities in these models. Even in the absence of aggregate productivity
shocks, they generate drops in productivity growth in recessions by linking the slowdown
in economic activities to a reduction in reallocation.
One novel analytical device in this paper is the use of Pareto distributions in modeling
the cross-sectional distribution of firm-specific productivities. In general when working
with models with a cross-sectional distribution of heterogeneous firms, aggregation is often
very difficult and the cross-sectional distribution itself becomes an infinite dimensional state
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variable. In order to circumvent this difficulty, this paper presents a model in which the
cross-sectional distribution follows a Pareto law at all times. This result is a combination
of two assumptions. First, we assume that the initial distribution of firm-specific produc-
tivities follows a Pareto distribution. This assumption is reasonable in light of empirical
studies which find that power laws are naturally prevalent in distributions of firm sizes
and productivities (Zipf, 1949; Gabaix, 1999 and 2008). Second, the assumed processes
of firm entry and exit are such that they dynamically preserve the Pareto distributional
property. Firm entry takes the form of imitation, and firm exit allows the right tail of the
distribution to survive, where the unique property of Pareto distributions that right tails
of Pareto distributions are Pareto distributions themselves is critical.
Looking ahead to the quantitative performance of the model, we find that the model
can generate substantial amount of medium term fluctuations in macroeconomic variables
through the aforementioned mechanisms. We also find that real wage and new business
formation are strongly correlated with output and TFP growth over medium term cycles
in the data, in support of the theoretical model. However, the magnitude of medium
term fluctuations we generate in the model are not as large as those in the data, and
our calibration results for medium term components in macroeconomic variables and risk
premia suggest that our model does not generate enough long-run risk in equilibrium.
When we match the volatilities of output and consumption growth to the data, we see that
the model does so by generating counterfactually large business cycle frequency fluctuations
and small medium term frequency fluctuations. Moreover, the volatilities of investment,
real wage, and new business formation are notably lower than those in the data, suggesting
that the central transmission mechanisms are not playing a quantitatively sufficient role.
However, attempts to find an alternative calibration of the model to generate larger medium
term components in these variables run into a fundamental difficulty. The crux of the
matter is that the model requires highly responsive rates of firm entry and reallocation to
generate and sustain large medium term fluctuations. However, the model does not have
an equilibrium when we calibrate our model by increasing the parameter that controls
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the sensitivity to which rate of firm entry responds to economic conditions. The basic
mechanism that we have described so far is that when a positive business cycle shock
hits the economy, expected firm value upon entry through imitation increases, inducing
a higher rate of entry. This intuition is the same as in models of expanding varieties,
for example, Comin and Gertler (2006) and Kung and Schmid (2012). However, there
is a countervailing effect in this model that a higher rate of firm entry reduces the value
of exisiting firms because incumbent firms will be forced out of business sooner because
of increased rate of entry. Then this reduction in expected firm value upon entry lowers
entry incentives of potential entrants, offsetting the procyclicality of the basic transmission
mechanism above. This is commonly referred to as the business stealing effect (Aghion and
Howitt, 1992) in the Schumpterian growth models. This is in sharp contrast to the class of
expanding varieties models where an increase in the number of firms are actually beneficial
to the existing firms through positive spillover of added varieties. Whether or not the
procyclical transmission mechanism dominates the business stealing effect is a quantitative
matter and our preferred calibration is one in which the former is stronger than the latter
in equilibrium and as a result, we generate substantial endogeonus medium term cycles.
However, the business stealing effect greatly limits our abilities in finding a more aggressive
calibration in order to generate larger medium term swings in macroeconomic variables.
Consequently, the model presents a partial success in generating endogenous medium term
cycles.
Sections 2 and 3 discuss the formulation and solution of the model. Section 4 evaluates
quantitative performance of the model. Section 5 concludes.
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1.2 Model
1.2.1 Households
There is a unit mass of identical households, each of whom has the Duffie-Epstein prefer-
ences in continuous time
Ut = Et ftf (Cs, U,,) ds] (1.2.1)
where
f (C, U)- I c_ - (1-Y) U (1.2.2)
((1- y) U) /
Here, p is the time-discount factor, 0 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and -y the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Recall that in the long-run risks literature (e.g., Bansal
and Yaron (2004)), we need both a persistent component in the consumption growth rates
and recursive utility for the long-run risks component in asset prices. Since our goal is to
study asset pricing implications of endogenous medium term cycles, it is essential that we
assume a recursive non-separable utility.
The households are also endowed with L units of labor (with L very large, representing
the upper bound of labor supply; for simplicity, we may assume that the labor demand is
always below this upper bound). We assume that the labor market is demand-driven as
in Uhlig (2007). That is, at the posted market wage Wt, the household simply supplies
whatever labor demand firms may have. Furthermore, the time path of Wt will feature
real wage rigidity to be discussed later.
1.2.2 Firms
There are firms with heterogeneous firm-specific productivities that produce the homoge-
neous final good. There are two scarce factors of production: labor and land. Firms take
as given the current wage Wt and make production decisions. Moreover, there is a unit
mass of land available for all the firms in the economy, and every firm needs a plot of land
to stay in business. The rental price of land is competitively determined to allow exactly
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unit mass of active firms at all times.
Active firms at time t are indexed by i E Qt. Every firm i has decreasing returns to
scale production function
yi,t = (Z-i,) tj
where Zt is the economy-wide productivity shock, zi,t and li,t are firm-specific productivity
and the amount of labor employed by firm i at time t, and 0 < # < 1 controls the concavity
of the production function. The assumption of decreasing returns to scale production
technology allows firms to have profits before fixed cost, in this case, rental cost of land.
The aggregate productivity shock Ze follows a stationary process representing transient
business cycle disturbances. In particular, let us assume that log Zt follows an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process:
d (log Zt) = -zlog Zt + -zdBt (1.2.3)
The long run economic growth in this model will come from enhancements in the cross-
section of firm-specific productivities {zi,t}iEO, over time.
As we will discuss in more detail, the cross-sectional distribution of firm productivities
will follow Pareto distributions at all times with constant shape parameter a > 0 and
time-varying minimum productivity level zt. This is not an ad-hoc assumption, but it
is a result of initial cross-sectional distribution that follows a Pareto law, along with the
process of firm entry and exit that we will discuss later. For now, it suffices to say that a
firm-specific productivity is drawn at random at the time of firm's entry, and decays at a
constant rate 6 until the firm is forced out of business by more productive firms:
dzi, 
-Jdt
zi,t
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Production Decision
Firm i with firm-specific productivity z = zit solves the following profit maximization
problem (in the following discussion, we suppress the subscript i):
7rt (z) = max {(Ztz) 10 - Wit - Ft (1.2.4)
Here, Ft is the fixed cost of production, denoting the rental price of land. The firm takes
as given wage rate Wt and rental price of land Ft when making this production decision.
The firm's solution is given by labor demand
It (z) = 31- (1.2.5)
Wt)
and therefore production output and profits are
Yt (z) = (Ztz) (it (z))O
= #1-03 (Ztz)1-0 Wt IS (1.2.6)
7rt (z) = (Ztz) (It (z)) - Wtlt (z) - Ft
= (1 - #) (Ztz)N Wt i - Ft (1.2.7)
Recall that there is a unit mass of firms whose productivities are distributed according
to a Pareto law with minimum productivity zt and shape parameter a at time t. The
analytic forms of firm output and labor demand, (1.2.6) and (1.2.5), can easily be integrated
with respect to a Pareto distribution for firm-specific productivities. First, the aggregate
output is given by
Yt= yt (zi,t) di
- Z W Z1di
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Since the firm-specific productivities have a Pareto distribution, the latter integral can be
computed in closed-form as
it = z di
a- 1 [
where we need a parametric restriction a > . With this calculation, we can write the
aggregate output as a function of Zt, Wt, and zt as
a 10 ) 1 10 11
Y = a p Zt W (1.2.8)
Similarly, we can easily aggregate the labor demand:
Lt it (z ,t) di
a 1 1 ) 1 1 1'a (1.2.9)
(a-11 aZi/3)Z 11 Wt _t
Along the deterministic balanced growth path, the exogenous randomness is shut down
and Zt is held constant. Hence, along the BGP, Y grows at a constant rate g, while the
aggregate labor demand stays constant. Examining the expressions for Y and Lt, we see
that both Wt and z grow at rate g along the BGP as well.
Entry Decision
Firm entry takes the form of imitation: an entrant draws its firm-specific productivity from
the current distribution of firm-specific productivities. Imitation, therefore, introduces
a spillover effect: past economic growth, in the form of an increase in the overall level
of the firm-specific productivities, benefit the future generations of firms. This positive
spillover is analogous to "standing on the shoulders of giants" in the Romer (1988) type
of models. Furthermore, this spillover effect greatly increases the persistence of medium
term cycles in the model. For example, in periods of prolonged recessions, the distribution
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of firm-specific productivities relative other fundamentals of the economy will be too low,
therefore attracting only a small number of entrants. This, in turn, will slow down the
pace of productivity growth through creative destruction, and we end up with a feedback
loop where a medium term cycle sustains itself beyond exogenous shocks. In this manner,
the assumption of firm entry through imitation is crucial for generating highly persistent
endogenous medium term cycles even when the exogenous process for business cycles Zt
has low persistence. Another assumption on our description of firm entry is congestion
effect: the cost of entry is convex in the rate of firm entry1 . This captures the idea that
it is easy to imitate and create a small number of firms, but as more and more firms look
to enter the market, they "fish in the same pond" for ideas, and potential entrants must
then spend more resources to enter the market. In particular, we assume that a household
must spend z No units of consumption good with 0 > 1 to create a mass Nt of new firms.
In turn, each new firm draws its initial productivity from the productivitiy distribution of
active firms at time t which is Pareto distributed with shape parameter a and minimum
productivity level zt.
We now discuss the optimal entry decisions of potential entrants. First, we define the
value function of a firm with current productivity z, V (z), as
Vt (z) = Et [t M,sirs (e-6(s-t)z) dsl (1.2.10)
where Mtsis the stochastic discount factor in equilibrium, e- 6(s-t)z stands for the firm-
specific productivity at time s, and T measures firm's (random) duration of survival until
its eventual exit. Then we can define the average firm value at time t as
Vt, = Vt (z) dFt (z) (1.2.11)
where F (.) is the cumulative distribution function of Pareto distribution with minimum
productivity zt . Moreover, since a potential entrant draws its productivity at random from
'Both Comin and Gertler (2006) and Kung and Schmid (2012) have this feature in the cost of R&D
investments.
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the current distribution of productivities, the expected firm value upon entry is also Vt.
Finally, a household solves the following maximization problem:
max{N, ft - ztNi}
The first-order condition of this maximization problem yields
Vt = Oz NO-' (1.2.12)
Clearly, holding fixed the current level of productivity distribution Zt, better economic
conditions as a whole translate to higher Vt and this induces a higher entry rate Nt.
Since the unit mass of households are all identical and make the same entry decision, the
aggregate number of firms entering at time t is equal to Nt as well.
Looking ahead, the rate of firm entry Nt will be constant along the BGP, while IVt and
,K will grow at a common rate.
Exit Decision
A central feature of the model is endogeneous growth through natural selection of more
productive firms. The modeling device in this paper that achieves the incessant process of
selection and reallocation is the fact that there is only a unit mass of land available. This
implies that if, as a result of entry, the measure of firms exceeds 1, the rental price of land
will adjust upwards so that only the right tail of firms with unit mass will survive, and the
least productive firms are forced to exit.
To be concrete, suppose that there is a measure Mt > 1 of firms at time t, so that
the distribution of firm-specific productivites is mass Mt times Pareto distribution with
minimum productivity zt. Note that this will be the generic case: we start from a unit mass
of firms whose productivites follow a Pareto distribution, and we add a mass of entrants
who imitate the current active firms.
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Variable profits before rental price of land are
vt (z)= (1 - #) A(Z z)TW Wt
Clearly, this is strictly increasing in the firm-specific productivity z. Given that there is a
unit mass of land available, the economy can only support up to a unit mass of firms. As
a result, the competitive rental price of land is determined so that the firms in the left tail
of the distribution cannot afford it and therefore are forced to exit.
According to this logic, we proceed in two steps. We first determine the threshold
productivity such that the measure of firms exceeding the threshold is 1. Then we find the
equilibrium rental price of land such that only the firms whose productivities exceed this
threshold find it optimal to remain active. On the first point, we want it such that
1 = Mt -Pr (z > it)
where the distribution of productivities at time t is mass Mt > 1 times Pareto distribution
with minimum productivity zt (we must necessarily have it > zt). Using the cumulative
distribution function for Pareto distributions, we have
it = Mtzi (1.2.13)
Moreover, since Pareto law has the invariance property where right tails of Pareto laws
have Pareto laws, we have that, conditional on z > it, the distribution of firm-specific pro-
ductivities has measure 1 and follows the Pareto distribution with minimum productivity
Zt. This distributional invariance property is the key reason why we work with Pareto
distributions along with the proposed dynamics of entry and exit.
In the second step, the rental price of land is determined so that only the firms whose
productivities exceed the threshold it find it optimal to stay in business. This is achieved
when the rental price of land is equal to vt (t), so that the firm at the exit threshold just
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breaks even. Therefore, the rental price of land, F, is set at
F = vt (it)
= 1  h (1 - 3) (Z it) 1j Wt (1.2.14)
In equilibrium, there will be a continuous influx of entrants and the rental price of land will
adjust so that only the firms in the right tail of the distribution are profitable and remain
in business. This captures the idea of natural selection and creative destruction through
reallocation of economic resources from less to more productive firms.
There are two implications of our assumptions on firm entry and exit. First, when
a firm cannot pay the rental price of land and is inactive at time t, we can conclude
that this firm will stay out of business forever. The reason is that once a firm is forced
out of business, imitation and natural selection imply that it will always have inferior
productivity relative to the active firms in the economy. Therefore, it is rational for a firm
to exit permanently when its productivity hits the minimum productivity threshold, and it
is indeed correct that firms who have non-negative profits in the current period will remain
in business. Second, the fact that the distribution of firm-specific productivities has a
Pareto distribution at all times is not an ad-hoc assumption. If we assume that the initial
distribution of productivities has a Pareto distribution, then the distribution must stay
within the Pareto distributional family because the transitional dynamics of firm-specific
productivities all preserve Pareto distribution. Namely, we have deterministic exponential
decay of firm-specific productivities (multiplication by a scalar preserves the power law),
firm entry by imitation (preserves the distribution, and only increases the measure), and
firm exit by selection (picks out the right tails that are again Pareto distributed). Thus,
the modeling device presented in this paper is a convenient way to model a rich dynamics
of heterogenous firm-productivities with entry and exit, while sidestepping complications
that arise from the general case where we have to keep track of the infinite-dimensional
distribution as a state variable.
26
1.2.3 Wage Setting
The labor market in this model is demand-driven: the firms make labor demands at the
pre-determined wage rate Wt and the household supplies the labor demand. As in Hall
(2005), Shimer (2005), and Blanchard and Gali (2008), we emphasize real wage rigidity.
The idea is that the real wage is slow to react to changes in the economic environment.
This mechanism will serve as a propagation mechanism as in the New Keynsian models.
That is, in good times, the wage doesn't catch up to the better economic environment
immediately and this serves to prolong the temporary shocks in the economy. The key
idea is that a temporary positive shock Zt will lead to more favorable situations for firms
and encourage more entrants. Through selection, this higher rate of entry leads to higher
growth in productivity. But wages are again slow to catch up to this improvement in the
economy-wide productivity, and even when the temporary shock goes away, the potential
entrant finds herself in a favorable situation because the imitation prospects are better than
the business situation. This endogenous feedback mechanism is at the heart of propagation
mechanism that will generate medium term swings, in which a temporary positive shock
has much longer lasting effects. In summary, we want Wt to have sluggish adjustment
with respect to both the short-term and long-term business condition variables, Zt and zt,
respectively.
The formulation of the wage dynamics is as follows: in equilibrium, the aggregate labor
demand Lt at the posted wage rate Wt is
Lt 0 0) 1 0 1 61
We can see that the aggregate labor demand is decreasing in the wage Wt, and therefore
there is a one-to-one relationship between aggregate labor demand Lt and wage rate Wt.
Since there is a unit mass of households, assume without loss of generality that Lt = 1 is
the "natural level of employment". Then we can find Wt as the corresponding wage rate
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for the natural level of employment as a function of Zt and zt:
1= a z Wt- Z- t z1
or
= 1 (1.2.15)
Now, given the current wage rate W and target wage rate Wt, the wage in the economy
will evolve in such a way to resolve the labor imbalance. That is, if Wt is too high so that
Lt < 1, then the wage will go down so that Lt will tend towards 1, and vice versa. In
particular, we assume that the wage follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that mean
reverts to the time-varying target levels Wt:
dWt = rw (V, - Wt) dt (1.2.16)
where r is the rate of wage adjustment.
1.3 Solution
Dynamics of Wt and zt
We will first discuss how endogenous state variables Wt and zt evolve as functions of
exogenous variable Zt and entry rate Nt and then go on to discuss how the equilibrium
rate of entry Nt is determined.
First, the evolution of the state variable Wt is given by (1.2.15) and (1.2.16).
Now, we can describe the evolution of the cross-section distribution of the firm-specific
productivities. The distribution of firm-specific productivities at time t is Pareto distribu-
tion with minimum productivity z and shape parameter a. Between time t and t + A,
mass A . Nt of new firms enter and all the firm-specific productivities decay at the rate 6.
Therefore, the measure of productivities at time t + A is mass 1 + ANt times Pareto dis-
tribution with minimum productivity e-smz . Then the endogenous selection mechanism
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will only allow for measure 1 of firms. Using (1.2.13), the minimum productivity threshold
zt+A will be given by
z:a, =(1 + AMt)1 e-zt
Hence,
dzt = lim kts dt
A~-40
(!Nt -6 tdt
dz 1
-- A = -Nt - 6 dt(131
We see that the growth rate in zt can be either positive or negative depending on Nt.
In equilibrium, good times will induce high entry rates Nt and lead to fast growth in
productivity. This will, in turn, reinforce the good economic conditions and this positive
feedback mechanism will give rise to medium term cycles.
Definition of Equilbrium
The equilibrium definitions are standard:
1. Firms make optimal productions and exit decisions.
2. Households make optimal firm entry decisions.
3. wage and cross-sectional distribution of firm productivities evolve as functions of the
exogenous shock Zt and households' entry decision Nt.
Let us discuss these conditions in more detail.
First, production decisions of firms are simple period-by-period profit maximization
problems without intertemporal dependence, and hence follow the profit maximization
rules as we discussed. Therefore, an individual firm's output and labor demand are given
by (1.2.6) and (1.2.5), and when we aggregate across all firms, we have aggregate output
Y and aggregate labor demand Lt given by (1.2.8) and (1.2.9). Moreover, the simple
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characterization for optimal exit decision of a firm is that a firm goes out of business when
its productivity is below the minimum productivity level in the economy, zi,t < z.
Second, note that the aggregate state variables in this model are Zt, Wt, and zt. It can
be easily seen that the state vector (Zt, Wt, zt) is a controlled Markov process from (1.2.3),
(1.2.15), (1.2.16), and (1.3.1).
Third, households own all firms and factors of production, labor and land. Therefore,
households' consumption is equal to aggregate output minus the investment costs of firm
entry
Ct = Y - zetN" (1.3.2)
The households' lifetime utility index Ut is given by (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) with consumption
Ct given by (1.3.2), subject to the optimality condition for Nt given by (1.2.12).
Numerical Solution Method
The state variables are Zt, Wt, and zt. The equilibrium quantities to be computed are
the utility index of the households Ut = u (Zt, Wt, zt) and the entry policy function Nt =
n (Zt, Wt, z). Now we present a numerical scheme for computing u (.) and n (-).
Recall the value function Vt (z) for a firm with firm-specific productivity z. Vt (z) is
defined for z > zt as
V (z) = Et [ Mt,syrs (e-5(s-t)z) dsj (1.3.3)
where
* t + r is the random stopping time, representing the time of exit for this firm. It is
defined for each path by
J Nds = a log - (1.3.4)
t ( Zt
This is an intuitive expression which says that the firm exits when the cumulative
entry in the economy introduces enough firms whose productivites all exceed the
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firm's productivity.
* The profit function 7r can be computed by combining (1.2.7) with the equilibrium
rental price of land (1.2.14). It depends on the aggregate state variables at time s
and the firm-specific productivity e-(s-t)z.
78 (Z) = #0 (1 -- 0) (Z81,)N Wt -z - 1 (1.3.5)
Since an entrant at time t draws its productivity at random from the Pareto distribution
with minimum productivity zt, its expected firm value upon entry is given by
t = fVt (z) dF (z)
where F (.) is the CDF of Pareto distribution with minimum zt.
Now we describe an iterative procedure for numerically solving the fixed-point problem
and computing the functions u (-) and n (.).
1. Construct a grid for the state space wt = (Zt, Wt, zt).
2. Start with a guess for n (.) on the grid. This pins down the transitional dynamics of
w because it is a controlled Markov process with control variable Nt. Moreover, at
each node, we know the output Y and consumption Ct. It then allows us to compute
the value function u (-) at every node by solving a fixed-point problem. Namely, we
can discretize (1.2.1) over a small time interval as
Ut ~ f (Ct,Ut)A + Et [Ut+A
where we can approximate Et [Ut+A] as a weighted average over the grid combined
with our knowledge of the transitional dynamics for the state vector. Moreover, once
we compute n (), we can compute the stochastic discount factor Mt,t+s = where
Mt = exp (ft fu (C,, U8 ) ds) - fc (Ct, Ut)
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3. We can now compute the firm value functions Vt (z). The assumed dynamics for
Nt = n (wt) allows us to compute both (1.3.4) and (1.3.5). Moreover, with the
stochastic discount factor we have computed in the previous step, we can compute
Vt (z) as in (1.3.3).
4. Using Vt (z), we can compute the average value of firms active in the economy, V (z),
by integrating Vt (z) across a Pareto distribution over z with shape parameter a
and minimum productivity zt. Then we can update Nt = n (wt) by the optimality
condition (1.2.12):
V (w) = Ozn (w) 0-1
5. Repeat steps 2 to 5 until the policy function Nt = n (wt) converges.
Asset Prices
Once we solve for the equilibrium numerically, we can easily compute asset prices. First,
the risk-free rate comes from the drift of the stochastic discount factor:
dM~
rf,tdt = -Et dMt 1
where
Mt = exp fu (Cs, U) ds) fc (Ct, Ut)
Also, value of the stock market, PM, is equal to the discounted sum of dividends:
P M = E[ M (s) ds
where L1 (t) denotes the aggregate profits in the economy,
U ( = 7r (zi,t) di
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Note that we can solve for the asset prices numerically using dynamic programming. Since
we know the values of Mt and H (t) at every wt = (Zt,W,zt), we can solve for the stock
market value Pt as a function of wt using the following approximation:
Pt ~ Et Me+ U (t + A)+ Pt+s
Simiarly, we can define and compute value of claims to labor income, rental income from
ownership of land, and consumption stream, call them P/, PtL, and PC.
1.4 Discussion
Calibration
We now turn to calibration of our theoretical model. The goal is to explore the model's
quantitative abilities to replicate key features of both short- and medium-run macroeco-
nomic dynamics, as well as salient features of the financial data. Macroeconomic quantities
in the model that can be directly mapped into the data are output, consumption, invest-
ment, TFP growth 2 , hours worked, real wage, and new business formation. Data on output,
consumption, investment, and hours worked, and TFP growth are standard and available
from Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on real wage and new business formation are
from Bureau of Labor Statistics and United States Small Business Association, respec-
tively. All variables except for new business formation are from period 1951-2010, while
new business formation data is only available from 1962. The model is discretized, numer-
ically solved, and calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Table 1 summarizes our choice of
parameter values, and we now turn to brief discussion of our choices.
First of all, we set a = 6 and # = 0.4. This is because a, the shape parameter of
Pareto distribution in the cross-sectional distribution of firm productivities, and #, the
returns-to-scale parameter in the production technology, are jointly determined to satisfy
the balanced growth restriction that both Wt and zt grow at the common annual rate of
2 In our model, growth in of z can be viewed as TFP growth.
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approximately 2%. We also set 6, the rate of depreciation in productivities, to 1% in order
to match the rate of new firm entry in the data (based on (1.3.1)). Moreover, the convexity
parameter in firm entry cost 0 is set at 0 = 3 to match the ratio of volatilities of investment
growth and firm entry rates. Optimal firm entry condition (1.2.12) shows that 0 controls
the sensitivity of firm entry rates to current business conditions as captured by expected
firm value upon entry. As we will see later on, the model behavior is very sensitive to
this particular parameter, and there is not much freedom in varying this parameter in our
calibration exercise.
The parameters governing the household's preferences are set to p = 0.015, -y = 5, and
= 0.5. As in Tallarini (2000) and Kung and Schmid (2012), the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution V) plays a much more important role in the quantity dynamics, whereas -y
controls the equilibrium price of risk in the economy. In particular, we choose 0 = 0.5 to
roughly match the standard deviation of consumption growth in the data, and set p = 0.015
to replicate the long-run mean of the risk-free rate. The risk aversion parameter is then
chosen to best match the risk premium in the economy.
Finally, the persistence parameters nz and n,, are set to Kz = 0.05 and tw = 0.02 to
roughly match the autocorrelations of output and real wage rates, respectively. We also
set the volatility of exogenous business cycle shock oz at o- = 0.02 to match volatility in
output.
Macroeconomic Dynamics
Table 2 reports means and volatilities of key macroeconomic variables. We begin by noting
that the model can closely match means and volatilities of output, consumption, and TFP
growth, as we aimed for in this calibration exercise. There are two notable areas where
the model moments differ substantially from the data. First, the real wage in the model
grows roughly at the same rate as output based on our balanced growth path assumptions;
however, in the post-war period, the real wage in the data has shown substantial stagnation.
This divergence between productivity and real wage has been widely noted by a number of
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authors, including Bosworth and Perry (1994). Second, standard deviations of investment,
firm entry, and real wage in the model are smaller than those in the data. As we will
show shortly, when we decompose fluctuations in these variables into business cycle (2-32
quarters) and medium term (32-200 quarters) components, we find that the discrepancy
between the model and the data are mostly from the medium term frequencies. In other
words, even though the model generates substantial endogenous medium term cycles in
these key variables pertaining to the central transmission mechanism of the model, it falls
short of generating sufficiently large medium term fluctuations as in the data.
Since the goal of this paper is to study endogenous medium term cycles, it is crucial to
analyze how the model and the data compare to each other separately for business cycle
and medium term frequencies. Tables 3 and 4 report standard deviations and correlations
with output for the macroeconomic variables of interest at business cycle and medium
term frequencies, respectively. There are a few notable observations. First, we can see that
model implied volatilities of output, consumption, and TFP growth are matched to those
of data (in Table 1) through counterfactual composition of business cycle and medium
term components in volatilities. In particular, volatilities of output, consumption, and
TFP growths at business cycle frequencies exceed those in the data at 95% significance,
and at medium term frequencies, they fall short of their counterparts in the data with
statistical significance. Second, from table 4, we see that investment, real wage, and
new business formation have large medium term components and that they are highly
correlated with medium term components in output and productivity. This evidence is in
broad agreement with the qualitative features of the model. However, we also see that the
model does not generate as large medium term components in these variables that serve
as the main propagation mechanism in the model. This is in contrast to the business cycle
components, where with the exception of new business formation, both investment and
wage show similar magnitudes in the model as in the data. This shortcoming of the model
is not a coincidence, but rather a fundamental feature of Schumpeterian growth models.
Let us discuss this point in detail.
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Limitations of the Model
As we have just seen, the quantitative limitation of the model stems from the fact that
the model cannot generate sufficiently large medium term fluctuations in investment, real
wage, and new business formation. An immediate response to this concern is to consider the
model mechanism that governs the sensitivity of investments and new business formation
to economic conditions. Through equation (1.2.12), expected firm value upon entry Vt
and entry rate Nt are positively related, so that shocks to economic conditions affect Nt
through their effects on Vf. Moreover, the convexity parameter 0 controls the degree of
sensitivity between these two variables, and we could ask ourselves how the model behavior
would change when we increase 0 to make the rates of firm entry and reallocation more
responsive.
However, there is an endogenous tension that limits the permissible range of 0, and with
higher values of 0 we run into disequilibrium behaviors. This is due to the business stealing
effect that is fundamental in Schumpterian growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). As
a way of illustration, suppose that we are in a favorable business condition, whether it be
at business cycle frequencies through high Zt or at medium term frequencies through high
productivity t in relation to wage Wt. On the one hand, firm profits as in (1.3.5) are high
in such times and this tends to increase Vt, the expected firm value upon entry. However, on
the other hand, there is a countervailing force in equilibrium that actually moves IVt in the
opposite direction. Obviously, a high Vt presents stronger incentives to enter the market,
and this increases Nt. However, this increase in Nt has the effect of lowering Vt because a
higher rate of firm entry implies a higher rate of reallocation in the economy, shortening
the expected survival of existing firms. Therefore, the equilibrium levels of Vt and Nt
are determined as a fixed point of these two forces, namely 1) the central propagation
mechanism implying positive relationship between IVt and N and 2) the business stealing
effect which offsets such increase in IVt when N increases. Furthermore, as this discussion
makes clear, the equilibrium is obtained in a cobweb argument involving Vt and Nt, and
whether we have convergent or divergent solution depends on the relative magnitudes of
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the two mechanisms. In particular, when the second force is stronger, the cobweb argument
results in a divergent solution, and we do not have equilibrium in such cases.
In absence of the business stealing effect, high values of 9 would presumably generate
large medium term swings. However, under these values of 9, the business stealing effect is
particularly strong, and tends to result in a non-equilibrium. Therefore, this endogenous
tension between the two forces limits the permissible range of 6 and prevents more ag-
gressive calibration schemes that intend to generate large medium term fluctuations as in
the data. It is worth stressing that this business stealing effect is unique to Schumpeterian
growth models, and it is not present in expanding varieties models (e.g., Comin and Gertler
(2006) and Kung and Schmid (2012)). To the contrary, in these models, new firm entry
actually benefits existing firms as their effective productivities increase, as can be seen from
the CES specification of their production technologies. As a result, it is relatively easier
for these models to generate large medium term swings in macroeconomic variables.
Asset Pricing Implications
Finally, we examine asset pricing implications of the model. Table 5 lists means and stan-
dard deviations of risk-free rate and returns to streams of dividends, labor income, rental
income from ownership of land, and consumption. First, we see that the model matches
the mean of the risk-free rate as in the data, but overshoots the volatility as is common
in calibrations involving low elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Tallarini, 2000). For
market returns, we consider levered returns to dividends as in Boldrin, Christiano, and
Fisher (2001), and the model generated equity premium is 2.3% compared to 7.6% in the
data. While the model implied equity premium falls short of the empirical value, it is sub-
stantially larger than that in models without endogenous propagation of shocks (Lochstoer
and Kaltenbrunner, 2010; Kung and Schmid, 2012). This evidence suggests that the theo-
retical model presented in this paper does indeed generate significant endogenous medium
term cycles and goes towards explaining the equity premium. However, due to the difficulty
in generating larger medium term components in output and consumption, we cannot fully
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account for the equity premium in this paper. Also reported are means and variances of
claims to labor income, rental income from land, and total consumption. Though they
cannot be readily compared to the data, we can see that the model succesfully generates
non-trivial amount of risk premia in equilibrium.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model in which medium term cycles arise endogenously in the con-
text of a Shumpeterian growth model. New firms drive out the least productive firms in
the economy and the resulting reallocation of economic resources from less to more pro-
ductive firms is the source of long-run economic growth in this model. Productivity growth
features substantial medium term fluctuations because of the two main transmission mech-
anisms, real wage rigidity and firm entry through imitation. As in New Keynsian models,
real wage rigidity implies that the wage adjusts in a sluggish manner so that shocks to
productivity are amplified and propagated. Moreover, entry through imitation creates a
positive feedback loop in which a positive shock to productivity leads to a higher number of
entrants who also benefit from imitating the high productivity. In turn, higher rate of firm
entry strengthens the original positive shock through creative destruction. Taken together,
these two mechanisms shape persistent medium term cycles as the economy's cumulative
response to exogenous shocks.
One methodological contribution of this paper is the use of Pareto distributions in
modeling cross-section of firm productivities. Rather than working with an arbitrary dis-
tribution in which case the infinite dimensional distribution becomes a state variable in
the dynamic equilibrium, we formulate convenient processes of firm entry and exit so that
the cross-sectional distribution dynamically evolves within the Pareto distributional family.
This results in a closed form aggregation of heterogeneous productivities and it eliminates
the need to resort to approximate methods that are often involved when working with firms
with hetergeneous productivities.
In terms of the quantitative performance, the model generates substantial medium term
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cycles in the key macroeconomic variables as well as sizable risk premia, but not as large as
those found in the data. This is due to a limitation of this particular formulation where the
business stealing effect weakens the channels of propagation decribed above. Further work
on an alternative formulation of the ideas presented in this paper with greater flexibility
in matching the data would be highly desirable.
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Table 1.1: Calibrated Set of Parameters
Parameter Description Value
p Subjective Discount Factor 0.015
Risk Aversion 5
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution 0.5
a Shape Parameter in Pareto Distribution 6
Returns-to-scale Parameter in Production 0.4
6 Depreciation Rate in Productivities 0.01
0 Convexity in Investment Costs 3
Kz Persistence in Exogenous Shock 0.05
-z Volatility in Exogenous Shock 0.02
r, Persistence in Real wage 0.02
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Table 1.2: Macroeconomic Variables
Model Data
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Output 2.0% 3.4% 2.0% 3.4%
Consumption 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 2.2%
Investment 2.1% 5.1% 2.3% 11.7%
TFP 2.0% 3.0% 2.2% 2.8%
Hours Worked 0.0% 2.1% -0.3% 1.4%
Real wage 1.9% 1.2% 0.4% 4.2%
New Business Formation 4.7% 6.2% 4.7% 13.2%
The model is numerically solved at a quarterly frequency under calibrated parameters
summarized in Table 2. Reported model moments are annualized averages over 1000 simu-
lations. Data on output, consumption, investment, TFP, hours worked are from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, and data on real wage and new business formation are from Bureau
of Labor Statistics and United States Small Business Association. Data on all variables
except for new business formation are from 1951-2010 and data on new business formation
are from 1962-2010.
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Table 1.3: Macroeconomic Variables at Business Cycle Frequencies (2-32 Quarters)
Model Data
Std. Dev. Corr. with Output Std. Dev. Corr. with Output
Output 2.9% 2.2%
(0.2%)
Consumption 1.6% 0.91 0.8% 0.87
(0.1%) (0.02)
Investments 4.4% 0.89 4.5% 0.84
(0.5%) (0.05)
TFP 2.4% 0.77 1.3% 0.83
(0.1%) (0.03)
Hours Worked 1.7% 0.94 0.9% 0.85
(0.1%) (0.04)
Real wage 0.4% 0.35 0.4% 0.41
(0.1%) (0.11)
New Business Formation 5.6% 0.84 9.3% 0.73
(1.2%) (0.08)
The model is numerically solved at a quarterly frequency under calibrated parameters
summarized in Table 2. Data on output, consumption, investment, TFP, hours worked are
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and data on real wage and new business formation
are from Bureau of Labor Statistics and United States Small Business Association. Data
on all variables except for new business formation are from 1951-2010 and data on new
business formation are from 1962-2010.
In extracting business cycle frequency components, we use the bandpass filter of Christiano
and Fitzgerald (2003) and isolate business cycle frequencies (2-32 quarters). Numbers in
parenthesis are standard errors of estimation.
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Table 1.4: Macroeconomic Variables at Medium Term Frequencies (32-200 Quarters)
Output
Consumption
Investments
TFP
Hours Worked
Real wage
New Business Formation
Model
Std. Dev. Corr. with Output
1.8%
0.9%
2.8%
1.7%
0.5%
1.1%
3.9%
0.85
0.83
0.86
0.32
0.69
0.81
Data
Std. Dev. Corr. with Output
3.0%
(0.3%)
1.6%
(0.2%)
9.8%
(2.2%)
2.4%
(0.2%)
0.3%
(0.0%)
4.0%
(0.8%)
11.3%
(2.3%)
0.75
(0.04)
0.67
(0.08)
0.82
(0.03)
0.17
(0.04)
0.74
(0.10)
0.77
(0.07)
The model is numerically solved at a quarterly frequency under calibrated parameters
summarized in Table 2. Data on output, consumption, investment, TFP, hours worked are
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and data on real wage and new business formation
are from Bureau of Labor Statistics and United States Small Business Association. Data
on all variables except for new business formation are from 1951-2010 and data on new
business formation are from 1962-2010.
In extracting business cycle frequency components, we use the bandpass filter of Christiano
and Fitzgerald (2003) and isolate medium term frequencies (32-200 quarters). Numbers in
parenthesis are standard errors of estimation.
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Table 1.5: Asset Pricing Moments
Model Data
E [rf] 0.9% 0.9%
0' (rf) 3.4% 0.9%
E [rM - rf] 2.3% 7.6%
a (rM - rf) 14.7% 18.5%
E [rI - Tf] 0.7% -
o (r1 - rf) 6.3% -
E[rL - rf] 2.6% -
o-(rL - rf) 16.3% -
E [rc - rf] 1.2% -
-(rc - rf) 7.6% -
We report means and volatilities of risk-free rate rj and market return rm. As in Boldrin,
Christiano, and Fisher (2001), we define the market return as the return on levered claims
to the dividend stream. Moments of real risk-free rates are from Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004). We also report model implied moments of returns to
streams of labor income, rental income from land, and consumption, denoted r, rTL, and
r, respectively.
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Part 2
Competition, Innovation and Asset Prices
2.1 Introduction
This paper presents a simple model of explicit marketplace competition in which the market
share of a firm in an industry is the main determinant of its investment behavior as well as
its valuation ratio. Each industry is described as a duopoly where the firm with a superior
technology has a competitive advantage and earns higher profits than its industry rival.
This basic mechanism provides incentives for firms to undertake costly investments in order
to gain technological advantages. A crucial aspect of the model is Arrow's replacement
effect (Arrow (1962)); industry laggards have more to gain from investments than leaders,
and consequently the laggards invest more heavily than the leaders. This result arises from
a combination of two features in the model: profits are increasing, but concave functions of
relative industry position, and it is easier for followers to catch up with the technological
frontier than it is for leaders to push the frontier. Consequently, followers derive higher
proportions of firm values from present value of growth opportunities than from value of
assets in place, and vice versa for leaders. In other words, industry leaders and followers
are value and growth firms with low and high valuation ratios, respectively. This model
offers a few novel perspectives and testable empirical predictions.
First, this model provides a new explanation for why older and larger firms tend to
have lower valuation ratios. Decomposing a firm's value into value of assets in place and
present value of growth opportunities, a low valuation ratio translates to a relatively low
share of value of growth opportunities in total firm value. The question can then be re-
stated as why do older and larger firms have proportionately less growth opportunities
than younger and smaller firms. Answers to this question include costs of agency conflicts
or unscalable scarce firm-specific resources that prevent large firms from growing much
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larger 3 . Under the Coasian view under which the boundaries of a firm are determined as
an optimal tradeoff between costs and benefits of different firm sizes, these arguments em-
phasize a convex relationship between firm size and its disadvantages. In contrast, Arrow's
replacement effect implies diminishing gains from technological advantages of larger and
more established firms, and it focuses on a concave relationship between firm size and its
advantages. This idea helps explain well-known empirical patterns that firms with higher
book value of assets, sales, and revenue invest less and have lower valuation ratios.
Second, strategic interactions and Arrow's replacement effect give rise to endogenous
variation in valuation ratios. Since the seminal work of Fama and French (1992, 1993),
we have focused our attentions on explaining cross-sectional patterns in expected returns
associated with cross-sectional variation in valuation ratios. However, we have not as often
explored fundamental economic mechanisms underlying variation in valuation ratios4 . In
other words, why do value and growth firms have low and high valuation ratios, and is
there a way to explain their differences through economically fundamental determinants?
Many theoretical models that study the value premium (e.g., Zhang (2005) and Kogan and
Papanikolaou (2012)) assume an exogenous cross-sectional variation in productivities or
investment opportunities and derive a value premium in expected returns. A goal of this
paper is to present a model in which such a cross-sectional variation arises endogenously due
to a simple economic mechanism regarding industry structures and Arrow's replacement
effect.
Finally, this model has a distinct empirical prediction about investment behaviors of
value and growth firms. Growth firms are industry followers that have stronger incen-
tives for investments and therefore invest at a higher rate than value firms. Moreover,
such spread in investments by the follower and the leader in an industry is an increasing
function of the relative gap between them. Since the followers as a whole are more active
in investments, they benefit more from economy-wide innovation shocks than the leaders.
Hence, periods of innovations and breakthroughs are when followers are more likely to be
3 See Iliev and Welch (2008).
'Cohen et al. (2003) is an empirical attempt to quantify sources of cross-sectional variation in value
spread.
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successful in closing their gaps with leaders. This argument implies that our theoretical
model suggests two aggregate variables that will respond to aggregate innovation shocks.
First, a positive innovation shock allows followers to catch up with leaders, hence a trad-
ing strategy consisting of buying industry leaders and selling short industry followers will
have low realized returns in such times. Since industry leaders and followers are value and
growth firms in this model, we will use return on the value-minus-growth (HML) portfolio
of Fama and French (1993) as a proxy for this return spread between industry leaders
and followers 5 . On the other hand, a positive innovation shock reduces the industry gaps
throughout the economy, and therefore the spread in rates of investments between the
followers and the leaders decreases in response. Again, proxying industry leaders and fol-
lowers by value and growth firms, I measure this change in investment rates of industry
leaders and followers by the difference in investment growth rates of growth firms and value
firms. Hence in this model, a positive innovation shock brings about both a low realized
return on the value-minus-growth portfolio and a low spread in investment growth rates
(that is, spread in investment rates between growth and value firms falls). Consequently,
this model suggests a positive correlation between return spread on value-minus-growth
and investment growth spread on growth-minus-value. We find that this prediction of pos-
itive comovement between the two holds true in the data for capital expenditures, but not
for R&D expenses. Looking deeper into the results for capital expenditures, we find that
most of positive comovement between return and investment growth spreads in the data
comes from the fact that value firms decrease their investments following high returns on
the HML portfolio. On the other hand, we find that growth firms' investments are not
sensitive to the returns on the HML portfolio, but instead they seem to be correlated with
the aggregate market returns.
Moreover, it is important to note that this empirical prediction is at odds with conven-
tional asset pricing frameworks. By return decomposition identity of Campbell and Shiller
(1988), high returns on the HML portfolio come from either a decrease in future expected
5 In a similar vein, GArleanu et al. (2009) use the HML return series as a proxy for innovation shocks in
studying impact of innovation on consumption cohort effects.
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returns or an increase in expected cashflows of value firms relative to growth firms. How-
ever, simple valuation arguments linking expected returns, investments, and profitability
(e.g., Fama and French (2006)) would imply that value firms would increase their invest-
ments relative to growth firms when either their costs of capital decrease (decrease in future
expected returns) or profitabilities increase (improvements in cashflow prospects). Thus,
this argument would imply that the return spread on value-minus-growth and investment
growth spread on growth-minus-value would comove in opposite directions, and this is
exactly the opposite of this paper's empirical prediction. The reason for this difference
is the following: the argument that investments increase in response to positive cashflow
news rests on the implicit assumption that the higher profitability will benefit the new
investments as well. However, in this model, when a firm's technological level increases
and results in a positive cashflow news, new investments now face a lower rate of return
because of Arrow's replacement effect, and the firm reduces its investments as a result.
Therefore, the fact that we find empirical support for our theoretical model highlights
the importance of considering strategic interactions of firms in studying firms' investment
behaviors. In particular, it seems that explicit modeling of industry structures may be
particularly important when analyzing cross-sectional variations in investments and asset
prices, while it may not be as crucial in studying aggregate macroeconomic and financial
quantities.
In this paper, we use a model of step-by-step innovations by Aghion et al. (2001). The
distinguishing feature of this model compared to the earlier models of endogenous growth is
that it emphasizes cumulative aspects of innovation. In most of the other models, there is
perfect knowledge spillover from innovations which implies that new entrants do not need
the know-hows from old technological improvements for the purpose of new innovations.
As a result, there is no concept of a firm as an ongoing entity: once an entrepreneur
has a successful innovation, she no longer innovates and simply collects monopoly rents.
The model of step-by-step innovations, on the other hand, involves a small number of
firms engaging in cumulative innovation. The big distinction between these two classes of
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models for our purpose is that the latter clearly defines the role of a firm and is better
suited in taking the model to the the cross-sectional data. Finally, this model of step-
by-step innovations is also a foundation of the theoretical model in Akcigit (2009), who
presents an empirical evidence that the R&D intensities of smaller firms are greater than
those of larger firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model in detail
and Section 3 discusses the equilibrium. Section 4 tests the empirical predictions of the
model. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model is cast in discrete and infinite time. The economy consists of a final good sector,
a continuum of intermediate goods industries, and a representative household.
Final Good Production
The unique final numeraire good Y is produced competitively using intermediate goods
{yv : v c [0, 1] } according to the production function
Yt = Xt exp f\IO log y,tdv), (2.2.1)
where Xt is an i.i.d productivity shock with lognormal distribution, ln Xt - N (0, o).
At each point in time t, the representative final good producer chooses its demand for
intermediate goods {yv,t} to maximize its profits rf,
FI
,ct= Y - pv,tyv,tdv,
where pv,t is the price of intermediate good v.
The first-order condition of this maximization problem with respect to yv,t yields the
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following isoelastic demand for intermediate good y,:
yvt- (2.2.2)
Pv,t
Intermediate Goods Production
Intermediate good y, is produced by firms vA and vB that collectively make up industry
v. The firms VA and vB produce a homogeneous good and compete in a Cournot manner
by deciding on production quantities. There is no entry or exit of firms in these industries.
An intermediate good firm has the production technological
yt = qVlt, (2.2.3)
where qvt and l, are the technological level and amount of labor employed by firm v'. This
production technological implies that the marginal cost of intermediate good production
for firm vi is
MC1 = W (2.2.4)
where wt denotes the wage rate at time t. Therefore the firm that possesses superior tech-
nological in the form of higher qt has lower marginal cost of production and consequently
enjoy higher profits in Cournot equilibrium. This basic mechanism acts as an incentive
for firms to undertake costly investment efforts to advance their technologies and these
innovations are the engine of economic growth in the model.
Demands for intermediate goods (2.2.2) rule out strategic interactions across indus-
tries. Thus, aside from intertemporal investment decisions, the equilibrium behavior of the
intermediate goods firms is characterized by Cournot equilibrium at each point in time.
In particular, consider industry v at time t, with two firms V^ and vB with technological
levels q, and qBt, respectively. The Cournot equilibrium consists of quantities (yAt)* and
(Yft)V* such that firm i takes as given the quantity of its rival (y-j) * and chooses its own
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quantity (y',t) * to maximize its profits so that
(yi,)* arg max (pv,t , (y)*) - MC,) y,,, (2.2.5)
subject to the industry demand (2.2.2)
Pv,t (Y t, Y rt - Y= A t B 'Vyo A + Y Be
and marginal cost MCJ given by (2.2.4).
The unique Cournot equilibrium quantities are given by (suppressing stars in denoting
equilibrium quantities)
y )(2.2.6)
Yt (qA t+ q B)2 W
B Vot (qv 2 t
yVt W + B2t (2.2.7)
with market price of intermediate good of type v equal to
Pv,t = + B Wt. (2.2.8)
Moreover, the equilibrium profits of the two firms are given by
qA2
7rvt = Aq B Y, (2.2.9)
B
, A +o B t . (2.2.10)
As a result, industry leaders produce more, and have larger market share and higher profits.
Moreover, the ratios of production quantities and profits of firms vA and vB can both be
expressed as simple functions of the ratio of their technological levels .
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Investment Decisions of Intermediate Goods Firms
Process of innovation and technological advances follows Aghion et al. (2001). In particu-
lar, we assume the following "technological ladder":
q1 = Anvt, (2.2.11)
where A > 1 and n E Z+ denotes the technological level of firm vi at time t (I will
use the term "technological level" to refer to both ni,,t and qt when no confusion arises).
Outcomes of innovation efforts are stochastic and hence nit and qQ are random variables.
Consider industry v at time t. Suppose that firm i has higher technological level than
firm j, that is nV > nig. I will refer to firm i as the leader and firm j as the follower.
Define the technological gap in industry v at time t by Ano,t = nV,,t - nv,t > 0. The
technological gap can evolve from time t to time t + 1 in three ways:
" The leader is successful at innovation and the follower is not. In this case, the
technological gap widens to Ano,t+1 = Anv,t + 1.
* The follower is successful at innovation and the leader is not. In this case, the follower
catches up with the frontier technological and the two firms become neck-to-neck.
Therefore, Anv,t+1 = 0.
" Neither is successful at innovation and the technological gap remains the same so
that Anv,t+1 = Ane,t.
Note that I rule out the possibility where both the leader and the follower are successful
at innovation by assuming that there is at most one breakthrough in each industry at any
point in time. Similarly, when the firms i and j have the same technological level ("neck-
to-neck"), the technological gap widens to 1 if either firm is successful (again, we rule out
the possibility that both are successful) and stays at 0 if neither is successful.
A stylized assumption in the model is that followers' technologies can jump by multiple
levels and catch up with the frontier technology over a single period. This particular form
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of the sudden catch-up is for the sake of analytic tractability, but the qualitative properties
of the theoretical model remain unchanged under milder assumptions. Namely, the key
assumption is that expected technological innovation per unit of investment spending is
higher for followers than leaders. There are two general arguments in broad support of
this assumption. First, in models with decreasing-returns-to-scale production technologies,
incremental gains from technological advances are lower for leaders than for followers.
Another argument that can justify this advantage for followers is that prospect of implicit
and explicit imitation means that it is easier to catch up with the technological frontier
than to push the frontier.
Innovation in our model comes from investments whose outcomes are uncertain. We
assume that the leader and the follower have the same cost of investments 6:
i = f (z), (2.2.12)
where z is the probability of successful innovation and i is the amount investment spending
in terms of the final good. Let us assume that there exists z C (0, oc) such that the cost
function f is defined over the interval [0, 2) and that f is twice continuously differentiable
with f' (.) > 0, f" (.) > 0. E can be interpreted as the upper bound on probability of
successful innovation. Moreover, assume that
lim f'(z) = 0,
z-+0+
and
lim f' (z) = +00.
These two conditions imply that the marginal cost of investments is very small at low
levels of investments and that it becomes very large when investments are near their full
capacity. These Inada conditions guarantee interior solution z E (0, 2) for optimal level of
investment.
6 However, as we discussed earlier, followers have more to gain from successful innovation.
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Finally, there is an aggregate innovation shock W. A high realization of W will bring
more successful innovations across industries. To be more specific, suppose that Wt is
an i.i.d random variable such that E [W] = 1 and its support lies within [W, W], where
o < _W < 1 < W < oo. Moreover, suppose that W We are now ready to explicitly
write down the evolution of the technological gap An,,t > 0 in industry v from time t to
time t + 1. Conditional on Wt+1,
Anv,t + 1 with probability zU, Wt+i
An,t+1 = 0 with probability zJVWt+i
Anv,t with probability 1 - (z± t + zV t Wt+1
(2.2.13)
where zit and zi't are investment decisions of the leader and the follower in industry v at
time t. Note that the assumptions on . and W guarantee that all probabilities in the above
expression are non-negative. If we integrate over Wti, we have the following evolution of
the technological gap in terms of unconditional probabilities:
An,,t + 1 with probability z,t
Ano,t+1= 0 with probability z, 3*
Ant with probability 1 - (Z, t + z
(2.2.14)
Similarly, if the two firms in industry v are neck-to-neck so that Ano,t = 0, then the
evolution conditional on Wt+1 is
1 with probability (zV t + zi, Wt+1
0 with probability 1 - (zVt + z Wt+1
(2.2.15)
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and the evolution in terms of uncoditional probabilities is
I with probability zit + z(1
Ano,,t+1 = .' (2.2.16)
0 with probability 1 - (Ztt + z t)
Firms pay out operating profits in excess of investments as dividends. Therefore divi-
dends of firm vi at time t, Dit are defined as
Di, - 7ri - f (zi ) wt. (2.2.17)
Households
The economy admits a representative household with labor endowment normalized to 1
who owns all the firms in this economy. The representative household has preference over
consumption of the final good and disutility of labor supply given by
10E #' (log Ct - Lt) , (2.2.18)
t=0
where Ct and Lt denote the consumption and labor supply at time t.
We assume that there exist Arrow-Debreu securities contingent on all realizations of
Xt+1 and Wt+1 at all times t, and therefore the household faces dynamically complete
markets. Note that there is another layer of uncertainty regarding success or failure of
individual investments. However, the optimal investment decision of a firm in the equilib-
rium will be a function of its relative industry lead or lag only. Therefore industries with
the same technological gap all face the same probabilities on the evolution of the techno-
logical gap. Since there is a large number of firms having a particular level of technological
gap in any point in time (in fact, a continuum), the law of large numbers implies that
the representative household can diversify away such idiosyncratic risks associated with
success or failure of individual investments.
In presence of complete markets, the dynamic budget constraint of the representative
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agent can be simplified to a static lifetime budget constraint
E0 tCj <; E ( t(Dt+wtLt)1
t=0 ..1t=0
where (t denotes the stochastic discount factor at time t, Dt the aggregate dividends at
time t, and wt the wage rate in the economy at time t.
2.3 Equilibrium
Households
In equilibrium, aggregate output must equal aggregate consumption:
Ct = Yt. (2.3.1)
The first-order conditions from the maximization problem of the representative household
allow us to pin down the stochastic discount factor and the wage rate as functions of the
aggregate output. In particular, the intertemporal Euler equation of the representative
household yields the stochastic discount factor
6+1 Yt+1 (2.3.2)
(t Y)-
On the other hand, the intratemporal first-order condition between Ct and Lt implies that
yt
or
wt = Yt. (2.3.3)
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Firms
The final good sector is comprised of competitive firms each with the common production
technological (2.2.1) that exhibits constant returns to scale. Thus the representative final
good producer makes zero profits and the quantity demanded for each of the intermediate
goods is given by (2.2.2).
Next, I turn to the equilibrium behavior of the intermediate goods firms. Each firm
maximizes its firm value, or discounted sum of dividends. That is, firm vi chooses optimal
output levels {yi,} ,and R&D intensities {zi, to maximize
Vj I= max Et D
= max Et (7r , - f (zS) Ws) . (2.3.4)
Now, the structure of the technological ladder (2.2.11) implies that the operating profits of
an intermediate goods firm from Cournot competition, (2.2.9) or (2.2.10), can be rewritten
as
r= Y t , ' (2.3.5)
where nit and ni, are technological levels of firm v and its rival vi, respectively. Therefore,
the operating profits are a function of the relative technological lead or lag nV - ni, and
the aggregate output only. In other words, in an industry with a technological gap equal
to n > 0, the leader's operating profits are given by H (n) Yt and and laggard's operating
profits are given by H (-n) Y, where the function H is defined as
1
H (n) = 1 (2.3.6)1 +A-n'
Therefore, using (2.3.2) and (2.3.3), the firm value in (2.3.4) can be rewritten as
VXj, = Y - maxlEt # (H (n,, - ni,,) - f (z,))1 . (2.3.7)
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To analyze the intermediate goods firms' optimal R&D decisions, I focus on Markov
Perfect Equilibria (MPE) where a firm's optimal R&D decision only depends on its relative
position in the industry nvt - nt. This is the natural equilibrium concept in this context,
because (2.3.7) makes it clear that the only relevant state variable is the firm's relative
position in the industry. Let z! denote the optimal R&D decision of a firm whose relative
position in its industry is equal to 5 = nvt - nVt, A E Z (A is positive if it is ahead of its
rival or negative if it is behind). Furthermore, the evolution of the technological gap in an
industry as described in Section 2 depends only on the level of the technological gap and
the R&D decisions of the two firms in the industry. Therefore, the equilibrium dynamics
of the technological gap An = Ano,t > 0 follows
Ano,t + 1 with probability z*
Ano,t+1 0 with probability z* , (2.3.8)
Anv,t with probability 1 - (zA + z4*An)
and similarly for An, = 0:
= 1 with probability 2z . (2.3.9)
0 with probability 1 - 2z0
Motivated by these observations, define the value function
J (5) = max.Eo [z #t (I (nt) - f (zt)) I5O = 5 , (2.3.10)
It=o
where 5 E Z denotes a lead or a lag. With this definition, (2.3.7) becomes
,t = J (ni,t - ni . (2.3.11)
The Markov Perfect Equilibria in this model are characterized by the following Bellman
equations. For a firm that is n > 1 steps ahead, its rival chooses R&D intensity z*.n, and
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its value function satisfies the Bellman equation
J (n) = max {(II (n) - f (z,)) + # (zJ (n + 1) + z*J (0) + (1 - Zn - z*.n) J (n))} for n > 1,
Zu
(2.3.12)
and z* is defined as the optimal R&D decision that achieves the optimum for the above
expression. Note that the aggregate R&D productivity shock Wtai does not enter the Bell-
man equation because the expectation is under time-t uncoditional probabilities. Similarly,
for the cases n = 0 and n < 0, we have
J(0) = max{(II(0) - f (zo)) +#(zoJ(1) +zJ(-1) + (1 - zo - z*)J(O))} for n = 0,
(2.3.13)
and
J (n) = max {(II (n) -f (z)) + # (zn J (0) + z*.:J (n - 1) + (1 - zn - z*) J (n))} for n < 0.
Zn
(2.3.14)
From first-order conditions on (2.3.12), (2.3.13), and (2.3.14), the optimal R&D investment
decisions are simple functions of the value function J(.):
z* f (#(J(n+1)-J(n))) ifn , (2.3.15)
f' (# (J (0) - J (n))) ifn<0
where f (-) is the production technological for innovations from (2.2.12).
Numerical Results and Discussion
In our discussion of the numerical solution, we will assume that f (-) takes on a specific
functional form that satisfies all of the assumptions above. In particular,
f (z) = _ , (2.3.16)
z - z
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where a > 1. However, it is important to stress that the qualitative features of the model
do not depend on this particular functional assumption.
The simple structure of the Bellman equations (2.3.12)-(2.3.14) and the optimal invest-
ment decision (2.3.15), along with the functional form for f (.) in (2.3.16) is convenient for
a numerical computation of the equilibrium via iterative methods for the value function
J (.). Figure 1 plots the equilibrium with /3 = 0.97 (time discount factor), A = 1.1 (rate of
technological growth), and a = 2 (exponent in the R&D investment technological f (.)).
It is worth stressing the sources and implications of Arrow's replacement effect in this
model. Arrow's replacement effect arises from two aspects of the model: first, the profit
function (2.3.5) that is concave in the relative industry position and second, the prospect
of sudden catch-up in the investment process. As a result, industry followers have more to
gain from innovations than leaders.
As expected, the firm value is increasing in relative industry position. We can also see
that investments are decreasing in relative industry position, due to Arrow's replacement
effect. Note that the kinks at zero for the value function and the investment policy come
from the assumption that followers catch up with the frontier technological when they
are successful at innovation. Also plotted is the earnings-to-price (E/P) ratio-firms that
are farther behind of their industry rivals have lower E/P ratios, or equivalently high
valution ratios in terms of the P/E ratios, because they derive a higher proportion of
their firm values from present value of growth opportunities (PVGO) than from assets in
place (loosely interpreted as current technological level in this model). It follows that the
industry followers are growth firms with higher valuation ratios and the industry leaders
are value firms with lower valuation ratios.
An interesting perspective presented in this paper is that Arrow's replacement effect
gives rise to endogenous heterogeneity in investment opportunities. Arrow's replacement
effect, a statement that industry followers have more to gain from successful innovation,
gives industry followers better investment prospects, leading to more incentives for innova-
tion on the part of followers. Therefore, it ultimately implies that industry followers derive
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a higher proportion of their firm values from present value of growth opportunities.
2.4 Empirical Results
Data
The main datasets used in the empirical analyses are COMPUSTAT Fundamentals Annual
and Quarterly data, CRSP Monthly Stock File, and Fama-French factor return series
available at Kenneth French's website. The construction of book equity follows Cohen,
Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) and the book-to-market ratio is constructed at the end of
each quarter as the ratio of the latest available book equity by calendar date and the market
equity value.
The main empirical predictions of the model are:
1. Industry leaders who have higher book value of assets, sales, revenue, and higher
earnings-to-price (E/P) ratio than industry followers have higher book-to-market
(B/M) ratios.
2. Industry leaders have lower investment-to-assets ratios.
3. When the return on value-minus-growth (HML) strategy is positive, value firms de-
crease their investment relative to the growth firms.
The first two of these predictions are well-known stylized empirical facts. On the other
hand, the third empirical prediction is novel and is at odds with conventional standard
asset pricing framework.
We now discuss each of these points in turn.
2.4.1 Industry leaders are value firms
Value of a firm can be decomposed into value of assets in place and the present value of
future growth opportunities. A central feature of the theoretical model in this paper is that
industry leaders derive higher proportions of their firm values from their assets in place
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than their industry rivals do. In other words, the model predicts that industry leaders
proxied by having higher book value of assets, sales, revenue, and earnings-to-price ratios
should have higher book-to-market ratios.
Top panel of Table 1 reports the book-to-market ratios of quintile portfolios sorted by
book value of assets, sales, revenue, and earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios. There are clear
monotonic relationships between these sorting variables and book-to-market ratios. As
predicted by the theoretical model, we find that industry leaders proxied by these various
measures have higher book-to-market ratios.
One potential concern for this result is that the correlation between these proxies of
relative industry position and book-to-market ratios might be driven by across-industry
variation rather than within-industry variation in book-to-market ratios. In order to al-
leviate this concern, I form quintile portfolios sorted by the proxy variables within each
of the 10 Fama-French industries and take the average book-to-market ratios across the
industries. In Bottom panel of Table 1, we observe the same monotonic patterns between
proxy variables and book-to-market ratios.
2.4.2 Value firms invest less
Another important aspect of the theoretical model is that Arrow's replacement effect im-
plies that the value of successful innovation is lower for industry leaders. This reduced
incentive for innovation for industry leaders leads them to invest less than industry follow-
ers.
In the empirical analyses, I focus on two measures of investments: capital expendi-
tures, and research and development expenses. It is important to stress that the notion
of investment in the theoretical model is quite general and it encompasses investments in
tangible and intangible assets whose expected rates of return are decreasing in the firm's
relative industry position. As we argued before, both capital expenditures and R&D ex-
penses can largely be thought of satisfying this crucial feature 7 . Furthermore, investment
7 In the case of capital expenditures, decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology and in the case
of R&D expenses, prospects of implicit and explicit imitation
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almost exclusively comes in the form of capital expenditure in some industries such as
telecommunications and energy. This is not to say that these industries do not innovate
over time, but it is more reasonable to think that how these costs of innovation are classi-
fied as capital expenditure or R&D expenses depends on the individual nature of business
across different industries.
Table 2 reports the average investment rates of firms within quintile portfolios sorted
by book value of assets, sales, revenue, and book-to-market ratios. In the top panel, we
see that investment rates of capital expenditures are monotonic across quintile portfolios
forms formed by sorting on book value of assets, sales, revenue, and book-to-market ratios.
Confirming a stylized empirical pattern, we see that value firms invest less than growth
firms. In the second panel, we report investment rates of R&D expenses, and we see
that there are much weaker relationships between R&D investment rates and the sorting
variables. While firms with higher book value of assets and book-to-market ratios seem to
have slightly lower R&D investment rates, the pattern is not monotonic across quintiles.
Moreover, sorting by sales or revenue do not generate meaningful spread in R&D investment
rates.
2.4.3 HML returns and spread in investment growth rates
Consider an industry whose technological gap closes from time t - 1 to t as a result of
successful innovation by the follower. We are interested in changes in firm values and
investment behaviors for firms in this industry in response to this change in industry
landscape. First, firm value is increasing in relative industry position (Top right panel,
Figure 1), and therefore the follower and the leader experience high and low stock market
returns as the leader's advantage is erased. Second, because optimal investment policy is
decreasing in relative industry position (Bottom left panel, Figure 1), the follower decreases
its investment spending and the opposite holds for the leader. Defining the industry return
spread as the realized return of industry leader minus that of industry follower, and industry
investment growth spread as the difference between the investment growth rate of the
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follower minus that of the leader, this discussion implies that the industry return spread
and the industry investment growth spread are positively correlated, driven by changes in
relative industry positions of the two firms.
Now suppose a large positive aggregate innovation shock Wt that brings about a wave
of innovations throughout the economy. Since industry followers invest more heavily in
equilibrium, this wave of innovations benefits followers more than the leaders throughout
the economy as can be seen in (2.2.13), and as a result, technological gaps in a large of
number of industries close. Therefore, the theoretical model predicts that return spread
on leaders-minus-followers and investment growth spread on followers-minus-leaders ag-
gregated across the economy will positively comove. Since industry leaders and followers
are value and growth firms in this model, let us proxy a firm's relative position in its
industry by its book-to-market ratio. The main reason for doing so is that it is diffi-
cult to empirically define and measure a firm's relative industry position. Moreover, we
have already presented empirical evidence that firms with smaller market shares tend to
have smaller book-to-market ratios in the previous section, as predicted by the theoretical
model. Consequently, a testable empirical prediction of the model states: aggregate return
spread on value-minus-growth and aggregate investment growth spread on growth-minus-
value comove positively. There are three important issues surrouding this central empirical
hypothesis.
First, this testable empirical prediction that the aggregate return spread and the aggre-
gate investment spread positively comove is phrased in terms of difference-in-differences.
Note that looking at investment growth rates, or changes in investments, removes variation
in investment rates that are specific to value or growth firms as a group. Also considering
the spread in investment growth rates, we remove variation in temporal fixed effects that
affect investment behaviors of all firms. Hence, the suggested empirical prediction is a
robust way to test the theoretical mechanism presented in this paper.
Second, it is important to note that this empirical prediction is at odds with conven-
tional asset pricing frameworks. By return decomposition identity of Campbell and Shiller
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(1988), high returns on the HML portfolio come from either a decrease in future expected
returns or an increase in expected cashflows of value firms relative to growth firms. How-
ever, simple valuation arguments linking expected returns, investments, and profitability
(e.g., Fama and French (2006)) would imply that value firms would increase their invest-
ments relative to growth firms when either their costs of capital decrease (decrease in future
expected returns) or profitabilities increase (improvements in cashfiow prospects). Thus,
this argument would imply that the return spread on value-minus-growth and investment
growth spread on growth-minus-value would comove in opposite directions, and this is
exactly the opposite of this paper's empirical prediction. The reason for this difference
is the following: the argument that investments increase in response to positive cashflow
news rests on the implicit assumption that the higher profitability will benefit the new
investments as well. However, in this model, when a firm's technological level increases
and results in a positive cashflow news, new investments now face a lower rate of return
because of Arrow's replacement effect, and the firm reduces its investments as a result.
Finally, the aforementioned conventional asset pricing theory predicts that stock returns
and investments have positive contemporaneous correlation. This empirical prediction has
been tested in a number of papers, but it has been found that the exact opposite holds true
in the data. Lamont (2000) first reports that the contemporaneous correlation between
stock returns and investments is negative with high statistcal significance using annual
data. He reconciles his finding with the original empirical prediction of positive correlation
by suggesting that lags in inplementing investments, or time-to-build, are to blame. He
finds that investment plans, rather than actual investments, are indeed contemporaneosly
positively correlated and lagged stock returns are positively correlated with investments at
a one-year horizon. Kuehn (2009) takes this a step further by refining Lamont's analysis of
time-to-build. He uses quarterly aggregate data, rather than annual data, and reiterate La-
mont's empirical findings: stock returns and investments contemporaneously have negative
correlation, and that lagged stock returns have positive correlations with future stock re-
turns (he finds statistically significant correlations at horizons of 1, 2, and 3 quarters). One
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takeaway from this literature is that although lags in investment due to time-to-build may
distort the positive correlation between stock returns and investment, when we examine
longer horizons, the cumulative investment growth rates and stock returns are indeed pos-
itively correlated, in accordance with standard asset pricing intuition. It is worth stressing
that the central empirical prediction of this paper is exactly the opposite, as we discussed
before. Since the timing of the relationship between the two are of importance, we work
with quarterly rather than annual data to parse out the relationship more clearly. Also, in
order to account for the potential lead-lag relationship between stock returns and invest-
ments, instead of one-period investment growth rates, we look at cumulative investment
growth rates over longer horizons to alleviate concerns of time-to-build. Remaining agnos-
tic to the magnitude of temporal lag in time-to-build, we look at investment growth rates
over several quarters.
Now, let us describe the data constructions and regression specifications in detail. First,
we use the return on the HML portfolio of Fama and French (1993) as a measure for aggre-
gate return spread on value-minus-growth. Second, to construct our measures for aggrgate
investment growth spread on growth-minus-value, we first compute book-to-market ratios
as the ratio of latest available book value of equity and market value of equity at the end
of each quarter. Firms are then sorted into quintiles based on book-to-market ratios, and
we call the top and bottom quintiles as value and growth firms. We track aggregate quar-
terly investments of value and growth firms, where the two measures of investments we
consider are capital expenditures and R&D expenses. As we are interested in cumulative
investment growth rates over multiple quarters, we consider aggregate investment growth
from formation quarter t - 1 to quarter t + k for k = 0, 1, ... , 4 and define the investment
growth spread as the difference in aggregate investment growth rates between growth and
value firms. Denote the realized return spread on value-minus-growth from time t - 1 to t
as HMLt and investment growth spread on growth-minus-value from time t - 1 to t + k,
for k = 0, 1, ... , 4, as IGSt+k. In the imain empirical specification, we regress IGSt+k on
HMLt, while the alternative specification includes the aggregate market return MKT as
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an additional explanatory variable.
Table 3 reports the results for capital expenditures (CAPEX). We find significant sta-
tistical evidence that aggregate return spread on value-minus-growth and aggregate invest-
ment growth spread on growth-minus-value over longer horizons are positively correlated.
The two spreads have positive relationships for k = 0 and 1, but are not significant at 5%
level. However, for k = 2, 3, and 4, we find significant evidence that the return spread on
value minus growth from quarter t - 1 to t and the investment growth spread from quarter
t - 1 to t + k are positively correlated. In other words, our results suggest than in times
when value firms have high returns relative to growth firms, value firms actually decrease
their investments relative to growth firms. This effect is stronger as we account for lags
in investments and consider cumulative investment growth over a couple of quarters. Now
that we have a strong support for the central empirical prediction of this paper, we exam-
ine value and growth firms' investment growth rates separately in how they react to the
realized return spread on value-minus-growth. Here, we find that most of the statistical re-
lationship comes from the value firms' investments. We report that value firms significantly
decrease their investments in response to positive HML returns, and considering additional
lags only strengthens this result. On the other hand, growth firms seem to increase their
investments slightly in response to positive HML returns, but this result is not statistically
significant. As an alternative specification, we consider adding aggregate market returns
as an additional regressor. We find that the main empirical prediction regarding positive
correlation between the return spread and investment growth spread holds up under the
alternative specification. We also report another interesting finding: investment growth
rates of both value and growth firms are contemporaneous negatively correlated with the
aggregate market return, but over longer horizons, they are positively correlated with the
market return. This finding is in accordance with earlier results by Lamont (2000) and
Kuehn (2009). Moreover, this result is particularly strong for growth firms. While not
statistically significant for value firms, it is highly significant and large in magnitudes. We
conjecture that this asymmetric response in investment growth rates to aggregate market
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returns is related to the literature on growth firms' reliance on external capital markets for
funding their investments (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997)).
Table 4 reports the results for R&D expenses. Here, we do not find significant results
pertaining to explanability of R&D investments by stock returns, even though we posited
that the theoretical model presented in this paper applies equally to capital expenditures
as well as R&D expenses. One pattern that we confirm is that growth firms' R&D in-
vestment growth rates seem to be weakly correlated with the aggregate market returns,
stemming from small firms' reliance on external capital markets for R&D investments,
reiterating the findings of Li (2011). Bloom (2007) suggests a reason why the dynamics
of R&D investments may differ from capital expenditures, even though we often think of
them similarly applied to intangible and tangible assets, respectively. In Bloom's model,
investments in the capital stock incur adjustment costs from changing the capital stock,
while investments in the knowledge stock incur flow adjustment costs from changing the
flow rate of new knowledge from R&D. In other words, by assuming that adjustment costs
in R&D investments are functions of rates of change in R&D, his model generates a much
more persistent process that is much less responsive to the business conditions.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study an economy comprised of many industries, each of which includes
two firms competing through technological innovation. The firm with a superior technology
enjoys higher profits, and this provides a strong incentive for firms to undertake costly
investments to capture a technological advantage. However, Arrow's replacement effect
implies that industry followers benefit more from successful innovation than leaders, and
as a result, followers devote more resources to investments. An immediate implication of
this model is that industry leaders and followers are value and growth firms with low and
high valuation ratios. Moreover, this model makes an empirical prediction that, at first,
seems to be at odds with conventional asset pricing frameworks. The model predicts that
aggregate return spread on value-minus-growth and aggregate investment growth spread
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on growth-minus-value are positively correlated. However, the standard intuition says
that stock returns and investments should positively covary, implying the opposite of our
empirical prediction. The difference stems from the fact that our model invalidates an
implicit assumption in the above argument: that positive cash-flow news does not extend
to new investments. We find that this central empirical prediction indeeds holds in the
data for capital expenditures, but not for R&D expenses. In particular, we find that value
firms decrease their investments in response to positive realized returns on HML portfolio,
but we do not find significant results for growth firms. Our empirical results suggest that
explicit modeling of industry structures may be particularly important when analyzing
cross-sectional variations in investments and asset prices, while it may not be as crucial in
studying aggregate macroeconomic and financial quantities.
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium
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Top left panel: operating profits normalized by aggregate output, top right panel: value function
J (), bottom left panel: investment spendings, bottom right panel: earnings (operating profits less
cost of investments) to price (E/P) ratio.
Numerical solutions are computed under the following parameter configuration: # = 0.97,
A = 1.1, and a = 2.
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Figure 2.2: HML Returns and Investment Growth Spread
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This plot is in terms of annual variables, while the empirical analyses in the paper are in
terms of quarterly variables, in order to show smoothed series. The solid depicts annual
HML returns and dotted line represents the difference between equal-weighted average
annual investment growth rates of growth firms and value firms. Investment is measured
by capital expenditures.
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Table 2.1: Book-to-market Ratio and Various Measures of Firm Sizes
All Firms
Sorting Variable Low 2 3 4 High
Book Value 0.22 0.39 0.65 0.80 1.11
Sales 0.35 0.42 0.73 0.93 1.05
Revenue 0.31 0.51 0.62 0.81 1.23
Earnings-to-Price 0.40 0.44 0.63 0.74 0.89
Within Industries
Sorting Variable I Low 2 3 4 High
Book Value
Sales
Revenue
Earnings-to-Price
0.29
0.37
0.33
0.44
0.42
0.44
0.49
0.51
0.68
0.65
0.63
0.66
0.77
0.84
0.82
0.73
1.02
0.99
1.13
0.85
In the top table, stocks are sorted into quintiles based on measures of firm size: book
value, sales, and revenue. We then report equal-weighted book-to-market ratios within
the quintiles averaged across the sample years. In the bottom table, we first divide firms
into 10 Fama-French industries and calculate equal-weighted book-to-market ratios across
quintiles within industries. Reported are averages across industries.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics on Investment Rates (I/K)
Capital Expenditures
Sorting Variable Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Book Value 0.51 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.14 0.37
Sales 0.44 0.35 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.31
Revenue 0.46 0.31 0.23 0.21 0.11 0.35
Book-to-Market 0.43 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.15 0.28
R&D Expenses
Sorting Variable Low 2 3 4 High Low -High
Book Value
Sales
Revenue
Book-to-Market
0.09
0.07
0.06
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.03
-0.01
-0.01
0.06
We report equal-weighted average investment rates (investment divided by assets) for quin-
tiles sorted by book value, sales, revenue, and book-to-market ratios. Two measures of
investments are capital expenditures and R&D expenses.
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Table 2.3: HML Returns and Investment Growth Spread (Capital Expenditures)
Growth Value Investment Growth Spread
HML MKT R2 HML MKT R2 HML MKT R2
k = 0 0.02 0.00 -0.07* 0.03 0.08 0.03
(0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
0.00 -0.11* 0.08 -0.05 -0.04* 0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
k = 1 0.01 0.01 -0.07* 0.05 0.07 0.04
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
0.01 -0.06 0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.09
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
k = 2 0.03 0.03 -0.09* 0.11 0.12* 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
0.03 0.08 0.20 -0.08* 0.02 0.13 0.11* 0.06 0.17
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
k = 3 0.04 0.06 -0.13* 0.15 0.15** 0.13
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
0.04 0.15* 0.33 -0.13** 0.04 0.19 0.17** 0.10 0.22
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
k = 4 0.04 0.06 -0.15* 0.18 0.19** 0.15
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
0.04 0.17** 0.37 -0.14* 0.05 0.20 0.19** 0.11* 0.24
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
The table reports regressions of aggregate investment growth rates of growth firms, value
firms, and the their differences from quarter t - 1
at time t. The measure of investments is capital
capital expenditures display significant seasonality
to t + k on HML and MKT returns
expenditures. Quarterly measures of
towards 4th quarters, and we correct
for seasonality accordingly in this analysis. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4: HML Returns and Investment Growth Spread (R&D Expenses)
Growth Value I Investment Growth Spread
HML MKT R 2 HML MKT R2 HML MKT R2
k = 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
k = 1 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
k = 2 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
k = 3 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.04 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
k = 4 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
-0.04* 0.07* 0.10 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.06
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
The table reports regressions of aggregate investment growth rates of growth firms, value
firms, and the their differences from quarter t - 1 to t + k on HML and MKT returns
at time t. The measure of investments is R&D expenses. Quarterly measures of R&D
expenses display significant seasonality towards 4th quarters, and we correct for seasonality
accordingly in this analysis. * and ** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Part 3
Fundamental Momentum
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, we study cross-sectional patterns in stock returns associated with various
accounting ratios. Accounting ratios of interest in this paper are measures of book returns,
namely return on assets and return on equity, turnover ratios in accounts receivable and
payable, and measures of profit margins, in terms of both gross and net profits. Our main
results can be summarized in three parts. First, we find that long-short portfolios formed
by sorting on these accounting ratios as well as their annual changes have large, positive
average returns as well as significant a with respect to both Fama-French three-factor
and Carhart four-factor models. We then ask the question of which of these two sets of
variables, levels of accounting ratios or their changes, are more important in the cross-
section of stock returns. We find significant evidence that changes in the accounting ratios
are stronger determinants of stock returns than their levels. Second, motivated by the first
finding, we document significant abnormal returns of portfolios formed by sorting on the
changes in the accounting ratios through an extensive set of regressions with widely used
risk factors. The two main portfolios in our study, long-short portfolios formed by sorting
on changes in return on asssets and return on equity, exhibit a of 0.5% to 0.75% per month.
Third, we find that the abnormal returns of the momentum factor can be explained by
inclusions of the factors formed by sorting on changes in the accounting ratios. Chordia
and Shivakumar (2006) report a similar finding and conclude from this regression evidence
that price momentum is fully explained and subsumed by "earnings momentum", where
they use the SUE portfolio8 as an explanatory factor. We examine their finding by running
double-sorts on past returns and change in return on assets or return on equity, and we find
8SUE stands for standarized abnormal earnings and is formed by sorting on change in earnings stan-
darized by standard deviation of quarterly changes. SUE portfolio is similar to our construction of factors
based on changes in return on assets and return on equity.
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that there are large return spreads across past returns even after controlling for changes
in return on assets or return on equity. Therefore, we conclude that the price momentum
effect is not fully explained by earnings momentum, even though regression results of price
momentum on earnings momentum might suggest otherwise.
Section 2 describes our data construction. Section 3 documents return performances
of factors formed on accounting ratios and their changes, and then answers the question
of whether levels or changes in the accounting variables are more important in the cross-
section of stock returns. Section 4 continues the previous section by reporting significant
and robust abnormal returns associated with factors based on changes in the accounting
ratios. Section 5 first reports regression results of price momentum factor UMD on our
accounting factors, and subsequently examines whether price momentum is fully captured
by earnings momentum. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Data
The main data sources are Compustat Annual and Quarterly Data Files for accounting
variables and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly data for stock returns.
Data covers the period from January 1975 to December 2010. The starting date is restricted
by the availability of reporting date of quarterly earnings in Compustat (item RDQ) as well
as poor data quality and limited number of data points in the earlier part of the Compustat
database. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), firms with negative book
equity, and firms with share prices less than $10. The restriction on share prices is a
conservative choice and is intended to alleviate the concerns that small companies are
prone to poor accounting data and that abnormal returns may primarily be driven by
illiquid stocks.
Accounting variables of interest are return on assets, return on equity, turnover ratios
of accounts receivable and payable, and gross and net profit margins (often referred to as
"the accounting ratios" in the rest of the paper). We denote them by lower case letters
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roa, roe, arturn, apturn, gmarg, and nmarg, respectively. Return on assets and return
on equity measure rates of returns to entire stakeholders and equity shareholders, respec-
tively. Return on assets, roa, is defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat
quarterly item IBQ) divided by one-quarter-lagged total assets (Compustat quarterly item
ATQ). Similarly, return on equity, roe, is defined as income before extraordinary iterms
(Compustat quarterly item IBQ) divided by one-quarter-lagged book equity (Compustat
quarterly item CEQQ). Turnover ratios in accounts receivable and payable measure the
number of times that balances of accounts receivable and payable are turned over, respec-
tively. Accounts receivable turnover, arturn, is defined as revenue (Compustat quarterly
item REVTQ) divided by average accounts receivable (Compustat quarterly item RECTQ)
over the current and previous quarters. Similarly, accounts payable turnover, apturn, is
defined as cost of goods sold (Compustat quarterly item COGSQ) divided by average
accounts payable (Compustat quarterly item APQ) over the current and previous quar-
ters. Finally, gross and net margins are measures of profitability. Gross margin, gmarg,
is defined as gross profit (Compustat quarterly item REVTQ minus COGSQ) divided by
revenue (Compustat quarterly item REVTQ). Similarly, net margin, nmarg, is defined
as operating profit (Compustat quarterly item OIBDPQ) divided by revenue (Compustat
quarterly item REVTQ).
In months in which quarterly earnings are reported, we define these accounting ratios
using the newly updated data. In other months, we define them based on the most recent
accounting data, and they are allowed to be stale for a maximum of five months. Finally,
we define changes in these accounting variables as a year-over-year change, current value
minus the value twelve months ago. The reason for defining annual, rather than quarterly,
changes is because quarterly accounting data displays significant seasonality. We note
changes in the accounting ratios by A preceeding the accounting ratio, so for example,
Aroa denotes the year-over-year change in roa of a firm. We will often refer to these
accounting ratios and their changes as "the levels" and "the changes", respectively. Table
1 summarizes the data definitions.
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In the empirical analyses, we will form a number of long-short portfolios by sorting
on various sorting variables. For each sorting variable, we take the following steps in
constructing the long-short portfolio, in the spirit of Fama and French (1993). At the
beginning of each month t, we use the median market equity of NYSE firms and split all
stocks into two groups, small and big. Independently, we define breakpoints for the sorting
variable at 30th and 70th percentiles using all firms, and assign firms to three groups low,
middle, and high. We then form six portfolios by taking the intersection and compute their
value-weighted returns for month t. Finally, return on the long-short portfolio is defined as
the simple average of return on the high portfolio minus return on the low portfolio, across
the two size groups. As a matter of notation, we denote the time series of factor returns on
the long-short portfolio by upper case letters corresponding to the sorting variable in lower
case letters. For example, ROA and AROA are factor returns on portfolios formed by
sorting on roa and Aroa, respectively. We will often refer to portfolios formed by sorting
on the levels and the changes in the accounting ratios as "factors formed by levels" and
"factors formed on changes", respectively. In addition, we denote by UMD, the standard
momentum factor constructed by sorting on cumulative returns from month t- 12 to month
t - 1 following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
Table 2 reports summary statistics of accounting ratios and their changes. We make
three main observations. First, while changes in the accounting ratios are close to zero on
average, their standard deviations are quite large. Second, correlations between levels and
changes of the accounting ratios are generally large and positive. Combined with the first
observation, this suggests that a substantial fraction of cross-sectional dispersion in levels
of these accounting variables is driven by recent changes in them. Third, we note that some
of these accounting ratios have significant correlations among themselves, both in terms of
levels and changes. Most notably, roa is highly correlated with roe, and to a lesser extent,
gmarg and nmarg. This is mechanical because the numerators of these ratios are closely
related to one another 9 . This pattern of correlations mostly holds in terms of changes as
9 Gross profits minus operating expenses equals operating profits. Operating profits minus taxes and
interests equals income before extraordinary iterms.
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well. The two turnover ratios, however, show much smaller correlations with other ratios,
both in terms of levels and changes.
3.3 Changes or Levels?
There is a large number of papers documenting abnormal returns associated with both
levels and changes in some of the accounting variables that we are currently studying. First,
there is an extensive literature that documents abnormal returns of portfolios formed by
sorting on roa and roe (e.g., Fama and French (2006), Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010),
and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2012) to name a few). Also, in a recent paper, Novy-Marx (2012)
studies the profit margin premium, and finds that portfolios sorted by profit margins
produce a large spread in returns. Moreover, originating in the accounting literature,
many authors have documented abnormal returns associated with changes in earnings. In
particular, Ball and Brown (1968), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), and Chordia
and Shivakumar (2006) report significant abnormal returns of the SUE portfolio which
closely resembles our AROA and AROE portfolios.
Given these previous findings, we begin our discussion by studying the average returns
and portfolio a of factors formed on levels and changes in the accounting variables. The
top panel of Table 3 reports return performances of factors formed by sorting on levels of
the accounting ratios. Sorting stocks by roa, roe, and arturn produce large return spreads
of 0.60%, 0.65%, and 0.38% per month, significant at 1% level. Moreover, factors ROA,
ROE, and ARTURN have large and highly significant a with respect to both Fama-French
three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. Moreover, although sorting stocks by profit
margins gmarg and nmarg do not produce large return spreads, factors GMARG and
NMARG have highly significant positive a against the two benchmark models. However,
APTURN does not show significant return spread or a with respect to the two models.
The bottom panel of Table 3 reports summary statistics of factors formed by sorting
on changes in the accounting ratios. We can see that return spreads generated by sorting
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on changes in the accounting raios are greater than or around similar magnitudes as those
generated by sorting on levels of the accounting ratios. Moreover, all of these factors formed
on the changes have highly significant and positive average returns and a with respect to
Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. Another notable observation is
that R 2 of factor regressions in the four-factor model are significantly higher than in the
three-factor model, suggesting that these factors formed on the changes are highly corre-
lated with the momentum factor UMD 10 . On the other hand, factors formed by sorting
the levels do not show a large increase R2 when UMD is included in the regressions, with
ARTURN, APTURN, GMARG, and NMARG showing negligible increases. Finally, we
observe significant correlations between factors formed on levels and on changes for the
ratios roa, roe, and gmarg. As we will discuss shortly, a large part of this correlation is
mechanical. As we have shown in Table 1, the levels and changes in these accounting ra-
tios have correlations between 40 and 50 percent. Therefore, it is not surpring that factors
formed on significantly correlated sorting variables show large return correlations.
In summary, we can see, for the most part, that the factors formed by sorting on levels
and changes in the accounting ratios both have large and positive average returns a with
respect to both Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. These results
are in broad agreement with the aforementioned papers that have documented large return
spreads and abnormal returns associated with factors formed on both levels and changes
in the accounting ratios. Given this observation, we examine the question of whether levels
or changes are more important in the cross-section of stock returns. We first note that we
cannot directly compare factors based on levels and changes in answering this question.
The reason is that the current level of an accounting ratio could be decomposed into its
lagged value a year ago and its year-over-year change. Therefore, if it were the case that
changes in the accounting ratios drive spreads in returns, factors formed on current levels
could mechanically inherit these return spreads. In order to control for this mechanical
component, we examine effects of one-year-lagged levels and year-over-year changes in these
10 We provide direct evidence for this in Table 10.
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accounting ratios in the cross-section of stock returns"1 . We tackle this problem in two
directions, first by using Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure and second by implementing
double-sorts.
In the first approach, we use the methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973). For each
accounting ratio, we determine the relative strengths of level and change in this variable
as follows: In each month t, we regress the cross-section of stock returns on both levels
and changes in the accounting ratio, in addition to log market capitalizations, log book-
to-market ratios, and cumulative past returns from month t - 12 to month t - 1, denoted
by und. In other words, we are interested in the predictive powers of level and change
in the particular accounting ratio, controlling for characteristics that are well-known to
be related to expected returns. Moreover, in each month t, we normalize both levels and
changes by their respective cross-sectional standard deviations in month t prior to running
the regression, so that their slope estimates could directly be compared to each other.
In the final step, we aggregate the slope estimates into a time series and determine their
average estimates and statistical significance. Table 4 reports the results.
For roa and roe, we see very strong results that changes in these accounting ratios are
much stronger than levels in explaining the cross-section of stock returns, with magnitudes
15 to 30 times greater1 2 . Moreover, though both levels and changes are significant, levels
show much higher statistical significance. These results are true regardless of whether past
returns umd are controlled for. The results are similar for the margin measures, gmarg
and nmarg. Lagged levels are hardly significant, yet changes are strongly significant with
magnitudes of slope estimates around 10 times greater. For the two turnover ratios arturn
and apturn, the magnitudes of slope coefficients for levels and changes are approximately
equal, but the result is much more statistically significant for changes than levels. In
summary, the cross-sectional regression results are all highly significant for changes in
the accouting ratios, with magnitudes often exceeding those of levels by more than 10
"If the accounting ratios followed a random walk, lagged levels and changes would be uncorrelated.
1 2We can directly compare their magnitudes because we have normalized both levels and changes prior
to the regression.
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times. These results clearly suggest that changes in the accounting ratios are stronger
determinants in the cross-section of returns.
In the second approach, we make use of the double-sorting methods to see if recent
changes in the accounting ratios produce return spreads, after controlling for the current
levels. The reason for this specification is as follows: From Table 4, we see that both levels
and changes are significant in the cross-section of returns, but changes being stronger of
the two. We are interested in a relative comparison of the two, noting that both are
positively correlated with average returns. We achieve this horse race between levels and
changes via double-sorting. We first sort stocks into five quintiles by the current level of
an accounting ratio. Within each quintile, we are effectively controlling for the current
level, and we then sort stocks in this quintile into further quintiles based on changes. In
this manner, we produce 25 portfolios, (dependently) double-sorted first by current level
and then by change. Note that the second step of sorting by changes also corresponds
to sorting on lagged levels in the reverse order, as we are already controlling for current
levels. Therefore, increasing patterns of returns across the change quintiles would suggest
that recent changes are stronger than past levels in the cross-section of stock returns.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 report our results from this double-sorting exercise. Looking across
rows, we see that sorting by changes produce mostly positive return spreads, after having
controlled for current levels. Moreover, around half of these results are statistically sig-
nificant. Again, these results serve as solid corroborating evidence to the results from the
Fama-MacBeth regressions. Therefore, we conclude that changes in the accounting ratios
are more significant determinants of stock returns than levels.
3.4 Fundamental Momentum
The previous section has illustrated that factors formed by sorting on changes in the
accounting variables produce large and positive average returns and az, and that they
are stronger represent strong phenomena than factors formed by sorting on levels of the
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accounting ratios. In this section, we take this finding a step further by documenting
various properties of the factors formed on changes in accounting ratios.
We observed in Table 3 that these factors have highly significant and positive average
returns and a with respect to both Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor
models. In Table 8, we elaborate on this finding by reporting the full time-series regression
statistics of these factors. There are three main observations. First, all of the factors formed
by sorting on changes in the accounting ratios produce large, positive, and highly significant
a with respect to both Fama-French and Carhart models. In particular, magnitudes of a
are quite large, ranging from 0.5% to 0.75% per month for AROA and AROE. With the
exception of AAPTURN, other factors also exhibit large a ranging from 0.25% to 0.5%
per month. Second, we can see that all of these factors have significant factor loadings on
the momentum factor UMD, and R2 of time-series regressions increase dramatically once
UMD is included. This close relationship between factors formed by sorting on changes
in the accounting ratios and price momentum is a strong and important one and we will
investigate this in more detail in the following section. Finally, we note that these factors
do not exhibit significant factor loadings on the Fama-French factors, especially after taking
into account the momentum factor UMD. Though often statistically insignificant, these
factors in general have negative loadings on the HML factor.
In Table 9, we check robustness of our results on the factors formed by sorting on
changes in the accounting ratios. We regress our factor returns on Fama-French factors
as well as the momentum factor UMD, Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor PS,
credit spread DEF1 3 , and NBER Recession Indicator REC. We can see that the factors
continue to have large, significant a after controlling for the additional factors. They also
consistently have positive loadings on the momentum factor. One noteworthy observation
is that many of the factors formed on changes in the accounting ratios exhibit negative,
and often statistically significant, loadings on credit spread, DEF.
Table 10 reports pairwise correlations of these factors formed on changes in the ac-
counting ratios and the momentum factor UMD. Similar to our results in Table 1, factors
1 3Motivated by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986)
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AROA and AROE are highly correlated with each other, while these two are also sig-
nificantly and positively correlated with AGMARG and ANMARG. AARTURN and
AAPTURN show weaker correlations with other factors, but the correlations are all pos-
itive. Finally, we note that all factors except for AARTURN and AAPTURN show high
correlations with UMD, with magnitudes above 45%.
Based on these results, we refer to our results on the factors formed by sorting on
changes in the accounting variables as "fundamental momentum". First, "fundamental"
refers to the fact that these factors are formed by sorting on accounting data, rather than
stock market data. Second, "momentum" refers to the cross-correlation between changes
in the accounting variables and subsequent changes in prices. In a similar spirit, Chordia
and Shivakumar (2006) refer to their results as "earnings momentum".
3.5 Relationship between Price and Earnings Momentum
In this section, we first examine whether the momentum profits can be explained by the
factors formed on changes. Table 11 reports regressions of the momentum factor UMD
on the factors formed on levels and changes in the accounting ratios in addition to the
Fama-French factors. There are two main observations. First, UMD has highly positive
and significant factor loadings on factors formed on changes. Moreover, AROA, AROE,
AGMARG, and ANMARG eliminate statistical significance of momentum a, with the
first two reducing the magnitudes of momentum a to 0.01% per month. Second, factors
formed on levels, on contrast, cannot explain the momentum profits. Though controlling for
ROA and ROE marginally reduces statistical significance of momentum a, but momentum
remains largely profitable.
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) makes a similar finding where they use the SUE port-
folio to explain the momentum profits. Based on this evidence, they conclude "our results
support the argument that price momentum is primarily subsumed by the systematic com-
ponent of earnings momentum and that price momentum is merely a manifestation of the
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earnings momentum." If this were true, this would be a very significant statement. Price
momentum still remains elusive despite much efforts, and if earnings momentum captured
the essential elements of price momentum, it would greatly help our quest for price mo-
mentum. Alas, we find that price momentum is neither fully explained nor subsumed by
earnings momentum.
We make this point by implementing double-sorts. If it were true that price momentum
is fully subsumed by earnings momentum, then sorting by past returns und should not
produce large return spreads, after controlling for changes in earnings by either Aroa or
A'roe. Tables 12 and 13 report average returns and a against Fama-French three-factors of
25 double-sorted portfolios for Aroa and Aroe, respectively. In these tables, we first sort
by Aroa or Aroe, and then sort by und. In Table 12, we see that return spreads across
quintiles sorted by umd are all positive and moreover most of the Aroa quintiles show
significantly positive a on long-short portfolios sorted by umd within the Aroa quintile.
A similar pattern occurs for Aroe in Table 13. These results provide strong evidence that
change in earnings, measured by Aroa or Aroe, does not subsume large return spreads
associated with past returns umd.
As a robustness check, we perform double-sorts in the reverse order, first sorting by
umd, and then sorting by Aroa or Aroe. Here, we see that sorting by Aroa or Aroe
produce return spreads, after controlling for umd. Therefore, it seems that both past
returns and changes in earnings are strong predictors of subsequent stock returns and
neither one subsumes the other. If anything, the results for return spreads associated with
umd controlling for Aroa or Aroe (Tables 12 and 13) are stronger than return spreads
associated with Aroa or Aroe controlling for umd (Tables 14 and 15).
Therefore, we disagree with the conclusion of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) that
"price momentum is merely a manifestation of the earnings momentum." Though our
factors formed on changes in the accounting ratios are able to explain momentum profits
in the sense of insignificant portfolio a, we observe that both price changes and earnings
changes produce large and significant spreads in stock returns. We conclude that though
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price and earnings momentum seem to share a common systematic component, residual
components in them are still significant in the cross-section of stock returns.
3.6 Conclusion
We study cross-sectional pattern in stock returns associated with accounting ratios and
their changes. We consider measures of book returns, operating efficiency, and profit
margins. We find that levels and changes in many of these accounting ratios produce large
and significant return spreads. In further investigating their properties, we make three main
findings. First, changes in these accounting ratios, rather than their levels, are important
and strong determinants of stock returns in the cross-section. Second, portfolios formed by
sorting on changes in the accounting ratios have very large and significant o with respect
to Fama-French and Carhart factor models, and this is robust to inclusion of additional
risk factors. We call our results, "fundamental momentum". Third, we document that
momentum profits can be explained away by these factors formed on changes. However,
we demonstrate that this regression result does not mean that earnings momentum fully
explains price momentum. In particular, we find that past returns generate large and
positive return spreads after controlling for changes in earnings, and vice versa. This leads
us to conclude that residual components in price and earnings momentum after accounting
for their common component still contain much explanatory power in the cross-section of
stock returns.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Accounting Ratio Definitions
Description
Return on assets
Return on equity
Acconts receivable turnover
Accounts payable turnover
Gross profit margin
Net profit margin
Definition
IBQ (t) /ATQ (t - 3)
IBQ (t) /CEQQ (t - 3)
REVTQ (t) /1 (RECTQ (t - 3) + RECTQ (t))
COGSQ (t) /j (APQ (t - 3) + APQ (t))
(REVTQ (t) - COGSQ (t)) /REVTQ (t)
OIBDPQ (t) /REVTQ (t)
Compustat item at month t is defined as the most recent data entry if there has been at
least one reported quarterly earnings during the past five months, and undefined otherwise.
Changes in these accounting ratios, denoted with a preceeding A, are defined as year-over-
year changes, i.e.,Ax (t) = x (t) - x (t - 12).
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Variable
roa (t)
roe (t)
arturn (t)
apturn (t)
gmarg (t)
nmarg (t)
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on Accounting Ratios and Their Changes
Levels
Variable Mean Std. Dev. roe arturn apturn gmarg nmarg
roa
roe
arturn
apturn
gmarg
nmarg
0.01411
0.03037
3.32528
3.10638
0.25196
0.01949
0.0448
0.1018
6.5013
2.8238
1.6959
2.7173
0.7821 0.0513 0.0782
0.0539 0.0349
0.1375
0.3217
0.2167
-0.0390
-0.2066
0.3518
0.2788
-0.0350
-0.0889
0.6810
Changes
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Corr(., A.) Aroe Aarturn Aapturn Agmarg Anmarg
0.0006
-0.0003
-0.0056
-0.0093
0.0107
0.0070
0.0455
0.0969
2.6819
1.6581
1.2987
2.1800
0.4154
0.5148
0.1965
0.2580
0.3560
0.3809
0.7755 0.0551 0.0215
0.0418 0.0078
0.1052
0.1848
0.1409
0.0246
-0.1644
0.2916
0.2246
0.0363
0.0027
0.5686
Corr(x, Ax) denotes correlation between accounting ratio x and its year-over-year change
Ax.
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Aroa
Aroe
Aarturn
Aapturn
Agmarg
Anmarg
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Factors Based on Accounting Ratios
Factors Formed by Sorting on Accounting Ratios
FF3 FF3+UMD
Factor Mean Std. Dev. av R2 a R2
0.0058***
[4.27]
0.0065***
[4.62]
0.0038***
[3.11]
0.0016*
[1.86]
0.0009
[0.8]
0.0020*
[1.73]
0.0268
0.0283
0.0219
0.0157
0.0194
0.0248
0.0075***
[5.49]
0.0077***
[5.61]
0.0042***
[4.44]
0.0009
[1.18]
0.0026***
[3.07]
0.0036***
[3.55]
11.4%
14.7%
37.8%
14.4%
48.1%
39.6%
0.0062**
[4.4]
0.0061***
[4.46]
0.0039***
[4.1]
0.0005
[0.65]
0.0027***
[3.21]
0.0034***
[3.07]
17.3%
22.8%
38.1%
15.8%
48.3%
39.8%
Factors Formed by Sorting on Changes in Accounting Ratios
FF3 FF3+UMD
Factor Mean Std. Dev. a R 2 ae R2 Corr(-, A.)
AROA
AROE
AARTURN
AAPTURN
AGMARG
ANMARG
0.0065***
[6.08]
0.0063***
[6.44]
0.0047***
[6.24]
0.0018***
[3.36]
0.0037***
[4.81]
0.0046***
[4.88]
0.0202
0.019
0.0166
0.0112
0.016
0.0198
0.0075***
[7.79]
0.0069***
[7.9]
0.0046***
[5.96]
0.0017***
[3.01]
0.0039***
[5.3]
0.0051***
[6.13]
8.0%
3.1%
0.4%
0.1%
6.1%
12.0%
0.0055'
[6.3]
0.0049***
[6.14]
0.0037***
[5.07]
0.0014**
[2.46]
0.0025***
[3.34]
0.0033***
[3.96]
32.6% o
31.6%
8.0%
2.1%
25.4%
31.1%
0.4317
0.4236
0.0425
0.0534
0.2789
-0.0200
Corr(X, AX) denotes return correlation between factors X and AX. Columns FF3 and
FF3+UMD report a and R 2 of regressions of factors on Fama-French three-factor and
Carhart four-factor models. Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, * and ***
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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ROA
ROE
ARTURN
APTURN
GMARG
NMARG
Table 3.4: Fama-MacBeth Regressions
Without Controlling for umd Controlling for umd
Variable I Lagged Level Change Lagged Level Change
0.0061**
[2.11]
0.0036***
[3.61]
0.0005
[1.04]
0.0009***
[2.71]
0.0011*
[1.74]
0.0012
[1.64]
0.1703***
[6.77]
0.0545***
[7.64]
0.0005***
[6.81]
0.0006***
[5.27]
0.0078***
[5.22]
0.0121***
[4.28]
0.0054*
[1.94]
0.0032***
[3.43]
0.0004
[0.87]
0.0008**
[2.54]
0.0009
[1.52]
0.0007
[1.08]
0.1401***
[6.30]
0.0456***
[7.26]
0.0041***
[6.40]
0.0006***
[5.55]
0.0060***
[4.86]
0.0094***
[3.88]
This table reports average slopes and their standard errors in Fama-MacBeth (1973) re-
gressions of returns on lagged levels and changes of accounting ratios, controlling for log
market capitalization, log book-to-market ratio, and cumulative return from month t - 12
to month t - 1 denoted by umd. The two regressors of interest, lagged levels and changes
of accounting ratios are standarized by their cross-sectional standard deviations in each
month t in the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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roa I
roe
arturn
apturn
gmarg
nmarg
Table 3.5: Double-Sorted Portfolios on Levels and Changes, roa and roe
FF3+UMD a of Portfolios Double Sorted by roa and Aroa
1
2
3
roa
4
5
5-1
1
-0.0069***
[-3.49]
-0.0007
[-0.39]
0.0007
[0.5]
-0.0003
[-0.2]
0.0018
[1.3]
0.0087***
[3.65]
2
-0.0036*
[-1.94]
-0.0021
[-1.59]
-0.0010
[-0.77]
0.0000
[-0.02]
0.0033***
[2.71]
0.0069***
[2.84]
Aroa
3
-0.0061***
[-3.05]
-0.0002
[-0.14]
0.0021**
[2.22]
0.0027**
[2.31]
0.0032***
[2.61]
0.0093***
[3.94]
4
-0.0045*
[-1.96]
0.0018
[1.35]
0.0004
[0.34]
0.0019
[1.44]
0.005***
[3.18]
0.0095***
[3.28]
5
-0.0014
[-0.51]
-0.0012
[-0.9]
0.0033**
[2.33]
0.0046***
[2.97]
0.0068***
[3.09]
0.0081***
[2.73]
FF3+UMD a of Portfolios Double Sorted by roe and Aroe
Aroe
1
2
3
roe
4
5
5-1
1
-0.0060***
[-3.23]
-0.002
[-1.28]
-0.0001
[-0.06]
-0.0009
[-0.62]
0.0018
[1.23]
0.0077***
[3.18]
2
-0.0042**
[-2.25]
-0.0024*
[-1.69]
-0.0014
[-1.2]
0.0008
[0.7]
0.004***
[3.27]
0.0081***
[3.75]
3
-0.0033*
[-1.81]
-0.001
[-0.73]
0.0000
[-0.01]
0.0020*
[1.75]
0.0036***
[3.22]
0.0069***
[2.99]
4
-0.0028
[-1.33]
-0.0008
[-0.72]
0.0011
[0.99]
0.0026**
[2.40]
0.0027*
[1.83]
0.0055*
[1.89]
5
-0.0047*
[-1.96]
-0.0004
[-0.23]
0.0028*
[1.79]
0.0028*
[1.65]
0.0068***
[3.94]
0.0115***
[3.87]
5-1
0.0055**
[2.13]
-0.0005
[-0.27]
0.0027
[1.3]
0.0049**
[2.35]
0.0050*
[1.95]
5-1
0.0012
[0.48]
0.0016
[0.73]
0.0029
[1.38]
0.0038*
[1.71]
0.0050**
[2.34]
This table reports a of 25
ratio x, then by sorting on
double-sorted portfolios formed by first sorting on accounting
change in the ratio ax within each bin (dependent double sort;
capturing return spread associated with different levels of Ax controlling for the level x).
Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, * and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.6: Double-Sorted Portfolios on Levels and Changes, arturn and apturn
FF3+UMD a of Portfolios Double Sorted by arturn and Aarturn
Aarturn
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 -0.0087*** -0.0032** -0.0027** 0.0015 0.0001 0.0088***
[-4.93] [-2.14] [-1.98] [1.09] [0.07] [3.57]
2 -0.0023 -0.0019 0.0012 -0.0002 0.004** 0.0062**
[-1.53] [-1.46] [1.07] [-0.18] [2.18] [2.47]
3 -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0029** 0.0009 0.0049*** 0.0062***
arturn [-0.9] [-0.06] [2.12] [0.68] [3.14] [2.67]
4 -0.0016 0.0017* 0.0013 0.0046*** 0.0012 0.0028
[-1.03] [1.75] [1.13] [3.26] [0.76] [1.27]
5 0.0024* 0.0017 0.0016 0.0046*** 0.003* 0.0006
[1.69] [1.04] [1.37] [3.32] [1.92] [0.36]
5-1 0.0110*** 0.0049** 0.0044** 0.0031 0.0029
[4.96] [2.29] [2.31] [1.56] [1.32]
FF3+UMD a of Portfolios Double Sorted by apturn and Aapturn
Aapturn
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 -0.0016 0.0031** 0.0005 0.0002 0.0022 0.0038*
[-1.21] [2.2] [0.42] [0.19] [1.4] [1.92]
2 -0.0025 0.0024* 0.0012 0.0026** 0.0006 0.0031
[-1.63] [1.8] [1.21] [2.01] [0.44] [1.59]
3 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0026** 0.0007 0.001 0.0009
apturn [0.09] [-0.12] [2.13] [0.56] [0.62] [0.48]
4 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0011 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016
[-0.11] [0.85] [0.75] [1.11] [1.04] [0.82]
5 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0015 0.0026 0.0037
[-0.66] [-0.44 [0.39] [1.24] [1.32] [1.34]
5-1 0.0005 -0.0037* -0.0001 0.0013 0.0004
[0.24] [-1.85] [-0.04] [0.69] [0.16]
This table reports a of 25 double-sorted portfolios formed by first sorting on accounting
ratio x, then by sorting on change in the ratio Ax within each bin (dependent double sort;
capturing return spread associated with different levels of Ax controlling for the level x).
Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, * and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.7: Double-Sorted Portfolios on Levels and Changes, gmarg and nmarg
FF3+UMD a of Portfolios Double Sorted by gmarg and Agmarg
1
2
3
gmarg
4
5
5-1
1
-0.0039***
[-2.7]
-0.0022
[-1.59]
-0.0022*
[-1.69]
0.0001
[0.07]
0.0010
[0.58]
0.0049**
[2.17]
2
-0.0014
[-0.97]
0.0008
[0.63]
0.0009
[0.63]
0.0009
[0.74]
0.0019
[1.37]
0.0033
[1.62]
Agmarg
3
0.0014
[1.13]
0.0024
[1.64]
0.0000
[-0.01]
0.0021*
[1.70]
0.0036***
[2.69]
0.0022
[1.14]
4
0.0014
[1.05]
0.0002
[0.14]
0.0022*
[1.84]
0.0033***
[2.89]
0.0041***
[2.86]
0.0026
[1.27]
5
-0.0002
[-0.13]
0.0014
[1.17]
-0.0006
[-0.32]
0.0009
[0.50]
0.0040*
[1.86]
0.0042*
[1.75]
5-1
0.0037*
[1.84]
0.0036**
[2.07]
0.0017
[0.97]
0.0008
[0.39]
0.0030
[1.09]
FF3+UMD a of Portfolios Double Sorted by nmarg and Anmarg
1
2
3
4
5
5-1
1
-0.0059**
[-2.57]
-0.0015
[-0.85]
-0.0012
[-0.81]
-0.0009
[-0.58]
-0.0006
[-0.41]
0.0053*
[1.85]
2
-0.0075***
[-3.4]
0.0007
[0.46]
0.0021*
[1.68]
0.0000
[0.03]
0.0004
[0.40]
0.0079***
[3.10]
Anmarg
3
-0.0015
[-0.74]
-0.0006
[-0.44]
-0.0001
[-0.1]
0.0033***
[2.67]
0.0011
[0.89]
0.0026
[1.10]
4
0.0027
[1.36]
0.0035**
[2.46]
0.0005
[0.37]
0.0046***
[2.8]
0.0047***
[3.79]
0.0021
[0.82]
5
0.0020
[0.74]
0.0023
[1.27]
0.0028
[1.29]
-0.0014
[-0.78]
0.0025
[1.41]
0.0005
[0.16]
5-1
0.0080***
[3.11]
0.0038
[1.52]
0.0040
[1.54]
-0.0005
[-0.24]
0.0031
[1.44]
This table reports a of 25 double-sorted portfolios formed by first sorting on accounting
ratio x, then by sorting on change in the ratio Ax within each bin (dependent double sort;
capturing return spread associated with different levels of Ax controlling for the level x).
Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, * and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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nmarg
Table 3.8: Regression of Accounting Factor Returns on FF3 and FF3+UMD
Factor a fMKT OSMB OHML /UMD R 2
AROA 0.0075*** 0.00 -0.06 -0.19*** 8.0%
[7.79] [-0.02] [-1.26] [-3.12]
0.0055*** 0.04 -0.08 -0.11** 0.23*** 32.6%
[6.3] [1.58] [-1.54] [-2.13] [6.55]
AROE 0.0069*** 0.00 -0.06 -0.11** 3.1%
[7.9] [-0.05] [-1.63] [-2.36]
0.0049*** 0.04** -0.07* -0.03 0.23*** 31.6%
[6.14] [2.06] [-1.96] [-0.78] [7.97]
AARTURN 0.0046*** 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.4%
[5.96] [-0.16] [0.44] [0.74]
0.0037*** 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.10*** 8.0%
[5.07] [0.45] [0.18] [1.64] [5.39]
IAAPTURN 0.0017*** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.1%
[3.01] [0.08] [0.35] [0.44]
0.0014** 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04** 2.1%
[2.46] [0.56] [0.18] [0.95] [2.42]
AGMARG 0.0039*** 0.03 0.02 -0.10** 6.1%
[5.3] [1.26] [0.52] [-2.3]
0.0025*** 0.06*** 0.00 -0.04 0.16*** 25.3%
[3.34] [2.97] [0.15] [-1.31] [6.00]
ANMARG 0.0051*** 0.01 0.05 -0.19*** 12.0%
[6.13] [0.46] [1.27] [-4.22]
0.0033*** 0.05** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.20*** 31.1%
[3.96] [2.13] [1.22] [-3.12] [6.70]
This table reports time-series regression results of accounting factor returns on Fama-
French three factors and Carhart four factors. Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics
and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.9: Regression of Factor Returns on Additional Risk Factors
Factor a IUMD OPS !3DEF OREC
AROA 0.0042*** 0.2173*** -0.0028 -0.1243*** 0.0031
[4.38] [7.35] [-0.09] [-3.06] [1.40]
AROE 0.0045*** 0.2195*** 0.0133 -0.1065* 0.0021
[5.39] [8.21] [0.47] [-1.87] [0.93]
AARTURN 0.0044*** 0.0900*** 0.0301** -0.0643 0.0002
[5.46] [4.36] [2.17] [-1.75] [0.08]
AAPTURN 0.0014*** 0.0469*** -0.0108 0.0181 0.0008
[2.59] [2.71] [-0.66] [0.58] [0.50]
AGMARG 0.0023*** 0.1342*** 0.0016 -0.0768** -0.0007
[3.32] [5.34] [0.06] [2.11] [-0.35]
ANMARG 0.0032*** 0.1845*** -0.0076 -0.1024*** -0.0005
[3.90] [6.55] [-0.21] [-2.68] [-0.23]
This table reports time-series regression results of accounting factor returns on an exten-
sive set of risk factors including the Fama-French three factors (market, size, and value),
momentum UMD, Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor PS, excess return on the Dow Jones
Corporate Bond Return Index DEF, and NBER Recession Indicator REC. The Pastor-
Stambaugh factor is from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The use of credit spread DEF
is based on Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986). Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.10: Correlations among Accounting Factors
Correlations
| AROE AARTURN AAPTURN AGMARG ANMARG UMD
AROA 0.8997 0.2946 0.1253 0.6177 0.7055 0.5295
A ROE
AARTURN
AAPTURN
AGMARG
ANMARG
0.2621 0.1356
0.2595
0.6197
0.3526
-0.1309
0.6643
0.2757
0.0741
0.7438
0.5436
0.2610
0.1319
0.4522
0.4819
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Table 3.11: Regression of Momentum Returns on Accounting Factors
Factors Formed by Sorting on Changes in Accounting Ratios
Factor a /MKT OSMB /HML /3FACTOR
None 0.0085*** -0.1800* 0.0850 -0.3384*
[4.50] [-1.93] [0.13] [-1.91]
AROA -0.0001 -0.1864** 0.1513 -0.1238 1.1795***
[-0.03] [-2.37] [1.16] [-0.77] [6.65]
AROE -0.0001 -0.1855*** 0.1499 -0.2112 1.2821***
[-0.02] [-2.62] [1.2] [-1.41] [6.95]
AARTURN 0.0054** -0.1655* 0.0939 -0.3362** 0.7320**
[2.20] [-1.76] [0.72] [-1.98] [2.42]
AAPTURN 0.0080*** -0.1869* 0.0936 -0.3501* 0.5577**
[3.93] [-1.83] [0.70] [-1.91] [2.48]
AGMARG 0.0038 -0.2288*** 0.0563 -0.2209 1.2868***
[1.64] [-2.72] [0.48] [-1.53] [5.05]
ANMARG 0.0032 -0.2034** 0.0180 -0.1336 1.1089***
[1.44] [-2.52] [0.16] [-0.86] [6.66]
Factors Formed by Sorting on Accounting Ratios
Factor a /MKT ISMB 3 HML OFACTOR
ROA 0.0054** -0.1767** 0.1995 -0.2685 0.4525**
[2.04] [-2.02] [1.48] [-1.4] [2.36]
ROE 0.0048* -0.1799** 0.2551* -0.3404* 0.5197**
[1.67] [-2.12] [1.95] [-1.95] [2.57]
ARTURN 0.0080*** -0.1659* 0.1097 -0.3934** 0.1812
[3.29] [-1.84] [0.83] [-2.1] [0.76]
APTURN 0.0083*** -0.1609* 0.0884 -0.3871** 0.3904
[4.12] [-1.78] [0.61] [-2.26] [1.47]
GMARG 0.0091*** -0.1881** 0.0769 -0.4127** -0.1441
[4.6] [-1.99] [0.57] [-2.24] [-0.57]
NMARG 0.0083***
[3.88]
-0.1746*
[-1.78]
0.1226
[1.13]
-0 .3603
[-2.04]
0.1172
[0.6]
This table reports regression statistics of UMD on factors formed by sorting on changes and
levels of the accounting variables, in addition to the Fama-French three-factors. Numbers
in square brackets are t-statistics and *, *, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 3.12: Double sorts on price and earnings changes
Average Returns of Portfolios Double-Sorted on Aroa and umd
umd
1
2
3
Aroa
4
5
5-1
1
0.0017
[0.42]
0.0034
[0.96]
0.007**
[2.32]
0.004
[1.35]
0.0055*
[1.71]
0.0038*
[1.66]
2
0.0025
[0.75]
0.0044
[1.58]
0.0081***
[3.66]
0.0046*
[1.89]
0.0071**
[2.43]
0.0047**
[2.07]
3
0.0026
[0.89]
0.0007
[0.27]
0.0051**
[2.03]
0.008***
[3.55]
0.0079**
[2.39]
0.0053**
[2.07]
4
0.0024
[0.8]
0.0048**
[2.01]
0.0071***
[3.03]
0.0073**
[2.5]
0.0106***
[2.68]
0.0083***
[2.65]
5
0.008*
[2.12]
0.0081***
[2.78]
0.0088***
[3.15]
0.0091***
[2.7]
0.0159***
[3.13]
0.0079***
[2.98]
FF3 a of Portfolios Double-Sorted on Aroa and umd
umd
1
-0.0055**
[-2.25]
-0.0034
[-1.52]
0.0003
[0.17]
-0.0022
[-1.25]
-0.0004
[-0.21]
0.0050**
[2.38]
2
-0.0038*
[-1.94]
-0.0018
[-1.16]
0.003**
[2.35]
-0.0007
[-0.56]
0.0021
[1.24]
0.0059***
[2.62]
3
-0.0033**
[-2.26]
-0.0053***
[-3.82]
-0.0002
[-0.15]
0.0028**
[2.39]
0.0031
[1.63]
0.0065***
[2.61]
4
-0.0023
[-1.46]
-0.0003
[-0.25]
0.0022**
[2.04]
0.0025
[1.62]
0.0054**
[2.26]
0.0078**
[2.48]
5
0.0035
[1.65]
0.0032**
[2.26]
0.0040***
[2.71]
0.0038**
[2.12]
0.0112***
[3.89]
0.0077***
[3.14]
5-1
0.0063*
[1.73]
0.0047
[1.41]
0.0018
[0.61]
0.0051*
[1.65]
0.0104**
[2.38]
5-1
0.0090**
[2.44]
0.0066**
[1.98]
0.0037
[1.23]
0.0060**
[2.09]
0.0116***
[2.84]
This table reports average returns and Fama-French a of 25 double-sorted portfolios formed
by first sorting on Aroa, then by sorting cumulative past return umd within each bin
(dependent double sort; capturing return spread associated with umd controlling for Aroa.
Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, * and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Aroa
1
2
3
4
5
5-1
Table 3.13: Double sorts on price and earnings changes
Average Returns of Portfolios Double-Sorted on Aroe and umd
1
0.0012
[0.29]
0.0039
[1.08]
0.0056*
[1.91]
0.0057**
[2.11]
0.0053
[1.63]
0.0042
[1.45]
2
0.0034
[1.01]
0.0047*
[1.65]
0.0061***
[2.67]
0.005**
[2.2]
0.0073***
[2.82]
0.0039*
[1.80]
umd
3
0.0036
[1.24]
0.0025
[1.04]
0.0036
[1.40]
0.0086***
[3.5]
0.0073**
[2.44]
0.0037*
[1.71]
4
0.0022
[0.76]
0.0062**
[2.47]
0.0067***
[2.93]
0.0076**
[2.47]
0.009***
[2.62]
0.0068**
[2.52]
5
0.007**
[2.01]
0.0076**
[2.57]
0.0076**
[2.55]
0.011***
[3.29]
0.016***
[3.06]
0.0090***
[2.97]
5-1
0.0058
[1.62]
0.0037
[1.28]
0.0020
[0.67]
0.0054*
[1.71]
0.0106**
[2.24]
FF3 a of Portfolios Double-Sorted on Aroe and umd
umd
1
-0.0058**
[-2.32]
-0.0032
[-1.57]
-0.0003
[-0.17]
0.0001
[0.05]
-0.0014
[-0.66]
0.0044*
[1.66]
2
-0.0030
[-1.58]
-0.0014
[-0.96]
0.0009
[0.64]
0.0001
[0.08]
0.0018
[1.27]
0.0048**
[2.23]
3
-0.0027*
[-1.94]
-0.0032***
[-2.72]
-0.0017
[-1.31]
0.0033***
[2.69]
0.0022
[1.4]
0.0050**
[2.37]
4
-0.0028*
[-1.88]
0.0012
[0.99]
0.0019
[1.55]
0.0031*
[1.83]
0.0035*
[1.76]
0.0063**
[2.39]
5
0.0025
[1.30]
0.0027*
[1.95]
0.0029**
[2.15]
0.0062***
[3.44]
0.0111***
[3.34]
0.0086***
[3.04]
5-1
0.0083**
[2.30]
0.0060**
[2.04]
0.0032
[1.12]
0.0061*
[1.95]
0.0125***
[2.87]
This table reports average returns and Fama-French a of 25 double-sorted portfolios formed
by first sorting on Aroe, then by sorting cumulative past return umd within each bin
(dependent double sort; capturing return spread associated with umd controlling for Aroe.
Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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1
2
3
Aroe
4
5
5-1
1
2
3
Aroe
4
5
5-1
Table 3.14: Double sorts on price and earnings changes
Average Returns of Portfolios Double-Sorted on umd and Aroa
1
-0.0010
[-0.27]
0.0037
[1.27]
0.0022
[0.82]
0.0076***
[2.85]
0.0071*
[1.72]
0.0081**
[2.12]
2
0.0041
[1.13]
0.0022
[0.80]
0.0029
[1.22]
0.0069***
[2.72]
0.0110***
[3.13]
0.0069*
[1.88]
Aroa
3
0.0046
[1.44]
0.0048*
[1.89]
0.0055**
[2.42]
0.0061**
[2.19]
0.0104***
[3.08]
0.0058*
[1.70]
4
0.0041
[1.23]
0.0073***
[2.96]
0.0059***
[2.61]
0.0099***
[3.78]
0.0131***
[3.27]
0.009**
[2.32]
5
0.0050
[1.43]
0.0053*
[1.88]
0.0062**
[2.28]
0.0064**
[2.00]
0.0136***
[2.67]
0.0087*
[1.84]
FF3 a of Portfolios Double-Sorted on umd and Aroa
Aroa
1
-0.0076***
[-3.25]
-0.0021
[-1.29]
-0.0028*
[-1.94]
0.0025*
[1.78]
0.0024
[1.10]
0.0100***
[2.60]
2
-0.0027
[-1.33]
-0.0039***
[-2.91]
-0.0026**
[-2.42]
0.0020
[1.49]
0.0066***
[3.21]
0.0093***
[2.61]
3
-0.0022
[-1.1]
-0.0012
[-0.93]
0.0005
[0.46]
0.0014
[1.09]
0.0052**
[2.52]
0.0074**
[2.26]
4
-0.0023
[-1]
0.0024
[1.59]
0.0006
[0.54]
0.0051***
[3.40]
0.0079***
[3.42]
0.0102***
[2.81]
5
-0.0018
[-0.75]
0.0000
[0.00]
0.0007
[0.5]
0.0012
[0.68]
0.0090***
[2.96]
0.0108**
[2.38]
5-1
0.0060***
[2.70]
0.0017
[0.83]
0.0040**
[2.13]
-0.0012
[-0.59]
0.0066**
[2.51]
5-1
0.0057***
[2.77]
0.0021
[1.02]
0.0035*
[1.83]
-0.0013
[-0.64]
0.0065***
[2.61]
This table reports average returns and Fama-French a of 25 double-sorted portfolios formed
by first sorting on cumulative past return umd, then by sorting by Aroa within each bin
(dependent double sort; capturing return spread associated with Aroa controlling for umd.
Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, *, and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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1
2
3
umd
4
5
5-1
umd
1
2
3
4
5
5-1
I
Table 3.15: Double sorts on price and earnings changes
Average Returns of Portfolios Double-Sorted on umd and Aroe
Aroe
1
-0.0031
[-0.81]
0.0033
[1.10]
0.002
[0.72]
0.0059**
[2.13]
0.0067*
[1.74]
0.0097***
[2.81]
2
0.0051
[1.45]
0.0044
[1.63]
0.0033
[1.29]
0.0080***
[3.33]
0.0102***
[2.69]
0.0051
[1.42]
3
0.0044
[1.31]
0.0039
[1.57]
0.0054**
[2.27]
0.0067***
[2.64]
0.0116***
[3.36]
0.0072**
[1.97]
4
0.0052
[1.58]
0.0059**
[2.37]
0.0052**
[2.33]
0.0095***
[3.28]
0.0129***
[3.42]
0.0077**
[2.07]
5
0.0035
[1.04]
0.0055**
[2.05]
0.0067***
[2.66]
0.0070**
[2.37]
0.0138***
[3.01]
0.0103**
[2.33]
5-1
0.0065***
[2.63]
0.0021
[1.09]
0.0048***
[2.94]
0.0011
[0.67]
0.0071***
[2.83]
FF3 a of Portfolios Double-Sorted on umd and Aroe
Aroe
1
-0.0097***
[-4.04]
-0.0028*
[-1.66]
-0.0036***
[-2.77]
0.0009
[0.63]
0.0022
[1.10]
0.0119***
[3.32]
2
-0.0021
[-1.13]
-0.0016
[-1.14]
-0.0017
[-1.37]
0.0033**
[2.36]
0.0055**
[2.47]
0.0076**
[2.33]
3
-0.0025
[-1.14]
-0.0019*
[-1.67]
0.0003
[0.29]
0.0020
[1.63]
0.0068***
[3.45]
0.0092***
[2.63]
4
-0.0011
[-0.47]
0.0005
[0.34]
0.0002
[0.13]
0.0050***
[3.42]
0.0077***
[3.52]
0.0087**
[2.40]
5
-0.0033
[-1.33]
0.0003
[0.19]
0.0011
[0.80]
0.0018
[1.08]
0.0086***
[3.27]
0.0119***
[2.86]
5-1
0.0065***
[2.67]
0.0031
[1.57]
0.0047***
[2.68]
0.0010
[0.58]
0.0064***
[2.60]
This table reports average returns and Fama-French a of 25 double-sorted portfolios formed
by first sorting on cumulative past return umd, then by sorting by Aroe within each bin
(dependent double sort; capturing return spread associated with Aroe controlling for umd.
Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics and *, * and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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1
2
3
umd
4
5
5-1
1
2
3
umd
4
5
5-1
Bibliography
Aghion, P., C. Harris, P. Howitt, and J. Vickers, 2001, Competition, imitation and growth
with step-by-step innovation, Review of Economic Studies 68, 467-492.
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt, 1992, A model of growth through creative destruction, Econo-
metrica 60, 323-351.
Akcigit, U., 2009, Firm size, innovation dynamics and growth, in 2009 Meeting Papers no.
1267. Society for Economic Dynamics.
Arrow, K.J., 1962, The economic implications of learning by doing, Review of Economic
Studies 29, 155-173.
Asness, C., J. Friedman, R. Krail, and J. Liew, 2000, Style timing: Value versus growth,
Journal of Portfolio Management 26, 50-60.
Ball, R., and P. Brown, 1968, An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers,
Journal of accounting research 1968, 159-178.
Bansal, R., and A. Yaron, 2004, Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset
pricing puzzles, The Journal of Finance 59, 1481-1509.
Bena, J., and L. Garlappi, 2011, Strategic investments, technological uncertainty, and
expected return externalities, Working paper.
Bilbiie, F., F. Ghironi, and M.J. Melitz, 2010, Endogenous entry, product variety, and
business cycles, working paper, Harvard University.
Blanchard, O.J., 1997, The medium run, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1997(2),
89-158.
Blitz, D., J. Huij, and M. Martens, 2011, Residual momentum, Journal of Empirical Fi-
nance 18, 506-521.
Bloom, N., 2009, The impact of uncertainty shocks, Econometrica 77, 623-685.
105
, M. Floetotto, N. Jaimovich, I. Saporta-Eksten, and S.J. Terry, 2012, Really
uncertain business cycles, Discussion paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Boldrin, M., L.J. Christiano, and J.D.M. Fisher, 2001, Habit persistence, asset returns,
and the business cycle, American Economic Review pp. 149-166.
Bosworth, B., and G.L. Perry, 1994, Productivity and real wages: Is there a puzzle?,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1994(1), 317-344.
Caballero, R.J., and M.L. Hammour, 1994, The cleansing effect of recessions, American
Economic Review 84, 1350-1368.
, 2005, The cost of recessions revisited: A reverse-liquidationist view, The Review
of Economic Studies 72, 313-341.
Campbell, J.Y., 1999, By force of habit: A consumption-based explanation of aggregate
stock market, The Journal of Political Economy 107, 205-251.
, C. Polk, and T. Vuolteenaho, 2010, Growth or glamour? fundamentals and
systematic risk in stock returns, Review of Financial Studies 23, 305-344.
Campbell, J.Y., and R. J. Shiller, 1988, Stock prices, earnings, and expected dividends,
Journal 43, 661-676.
Campbell, J.Y., and T. Vuolteenaho, 2004, Bad beta, good beta, American Economic
Review 94, 1249-1275.
Carhart, M.M., 2007, On persistence in mutual fund performance, The Journal of finance
52, 57-82.
Chan, L.K.C., N. Jegadeesh, and J. Lakonishok, 1996, Momentum strategies, The Journal
of Finance 51, 1681-1713.
Chen, L., R. Novy-Marx, and L. Zhang, 2010, An alternative three-factor model, Working
paper.
106
Chen, L., and L. Zhang, 2010, A better three-factor model that explains more anomalies,
Journal of Finance 65, 563-594.
Chen, N.F., R. Roll, and S.A. Ross, 1986, Economic forces and the stock market, Journal
of business pp. 383-403.
Chordia, T., and L. Shivakumar, 2006, Earnings and price momentum, Journal of financial
economics 80, 627-656.
Christiano, L.J., and T.J. Fitzgerald, 2003, The band pass filter, International Economic
Review 44, 435-465.
Cohen, R.B., C. Polk, and T. Vuolteenaho, 2003, The value spread, Journal of Finance
58, 609-641.
Comin, D., and M. Gertler, 2006, Medium-term business cycles, American Economic Re-
view 96, 523-551.
and A.M. Santacreu, 2009, Technology innovation and diffusion as sources of
output and asset price fluctuations, working paper, NYU.
Eisfeldt, A.L., and A.A. Rampini, 2006, Capital reallocation and liquidity, Journal of
Monetary Economics 53, 369-399.
Fama, E.F., and K.R. French, 1993a, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and
bonds, Journal of financial economics 33, 3-56.
, 1993b, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, Journal of
Financial Economics 33, 3-56.
, 1995, Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns, Journal of Finance
50, 131-155.
, 2008, Dissecting anomalies, The Journal of Finance 63, 1653-1678.
107
Fama, E.F., and J.D. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests, The
Journal of Political Economy pp. 607-636.
Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and C. J. Krizan, 2000, New Developments in Productivity
Analysis . chap. Aggregate Productivity Growth: Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence
(NBER, University of Chicago Press).
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and C.J. Krizan, 2006, Market selection, reallocation, and
restructuring in the u.s. retail trade sector in the 1990s, The Review of Economics and
Statistics 88, 748-758.
Gabaix, X., 1999, Zipf's law and the growth of cities, The American Economic Review 89,
129-132.
, 2008, Power laws in economics and finance, Discussion paper, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Gabler, A., and 0. Licandro, 2007, Endogenous growth through selection and imitation,
Working paper.
Garleanu, N., L. Kogan, and S. Panageas, 2009, The demographics of innovation and asset
returns, Discussion paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gomes, J., L. Kogan, and L. Zhang, 2003, Equilibrium cross section of returns, Journal of
Political Economy 111, 693-732.
Hall, R.E., 2005, Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness, American
Economic Review 95(1), 50-65.
Hou, K., and D. Robinson, 2006, Industry concentration and average stock returns, Journal
of Finance 61, 1927-1956.
Hou, K., C. Xue, and L. Zhang, 2012, Digesting anomalies: An investment approach,
Working paper.
108
Iliev, P., and I. Welch, 2012, A model of operational slack: The short-run, medium-run,
and long-run consequences of limited attention, Journal of Law, Economics, and Orga-
nization Forthcoming.
Jaimovich, N., and M. Floetotto, 2008, Firm dynamics, markup variations, and the business
cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 1238-1252.
Jegadeesh, N., and S. Titman, 1993, Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Impli-
cations for stock market efficiency, The Journal of Finance 48, 65-91.
Kaltenbrunner, G., and L. Lochstoer, 2010, Long-run risk through consumption smoothing,
Review of Financial Studies 23, 3141-3189.
Kung, H., and L. Schmid, 2011, Innovation, growth and asset prices, working paper, Duke
University.
Liu, L.X., T.M. Whited, and L. Zhang, 2009, Investment-based expected stock returns,
Journal of Political Economy 117, 1105-1139.
Liu, N., and L. Zhang, 2008, Is the value spread a useful predictor of returns?, Journal of
Financial Markets 11, 199-227.
Mansfield, E., M. Schwartz, and S. Wagner, 1981, Imitation costs and patents: an empirical
study, The Economic Journal pp. 907-918.
Melitz, M.J., 2003, The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity, Econometrica 71, 1695-1725.
Novy-Marx, R., 2012, The other side of value: The gross profitability premium, Working
paper.
Pastor, L'., and R.F. Stambaugh, 2003, Liquidity risk and expected stock returns, Journal
of Political Economy 111, 642-685.
Shimer, R., 2005, The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies, Amer-
ican Economic Review 95(1), 25-49.
109
Tallarini, T.D., 2000, Risk-sensitive real business cycles, Journal of Monetary Economics
45, 507-532.
Tilton, J.E., 1971, Semiconductors and the worldwide spread of technology: Highlights of
international diffusion of technology; the case of semiconductors, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity.
Uhlig, H., 2007, Explaining asset prices with external habits and wage rigidities in a dsge
model, American Economic Review 97(2), 239-243.
Vuolteenaho, T., 1999, Understanding the aggregate book-to-market ratio, Unpublished
Manuscript.
, 2002, What drives firm-level stock returns?, Journal of Finance 57, 233-264.
Xing, Y., 2008, Interpreting the value effect through the q-theory: An empirical investiga-
tion, Review of Financial Studies 21, 1767-1795.
Zhang, L., 2005, The value premium, Journal of Finance 60, 67-103.
Zipf, G.K., 1949, Human behavior and the principle of least effort., Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: Addison- Wesley.
110
